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ABSTRACT 
Michael A. Schultz: Staying, Moving, and Vocational Training: Explaining the Career Wage 
Mobility of Low-end Service Workers in the U.S. and W. Germany  
(Under the direction of Arne L. Kalleberg) 
 
 Do strong vocational training systems lead to higher wages for low-end service workers 
over their careers? Low-wage work is growing in the advanced capitalist countries raising the 
question of how differences in vocational training systems affect wage mobility. Previous studies 
of wage mobility for low-wage workers rarely account for the influence of detailed occupations 
or country-level institutions. I address these weaknesses by analyzing the career wage mobility 
of workers in seven low-end service occupations in the U.S. and West Germany. I find that 
workers entering these occupations in both countries have similarly low rates of wage growth. 
The primary route to upward mobility in both countries is by moving occupations. Occupational 
mobility is lower in Germany likely due to barriers created by the strong vocational training 
system. This results in lower odds for upward mobility in Germany than in the U.S. for workers 
in the same low-end service occupation.  
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STAYING, MOVING, AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
 
  The transition to the service economy in the advanced capitalist countries of Europe, 
Asia, and North America is creating a new economy. For the past the 30 years, the number of 
manufacturing jobs had declined. Jobs in finance and business services on the high-wage end and 
retail, hotels, and restaurants on the low-wage end are replacing them (Wren 2013). Most of the 
job growth since the 2008 Great Recession in the U.S. is in low-end service occupations. 
Consequently, the recession may have hastened the trend towards the new economy dominated 
by low-wage work. Many observers are interested in how this transition to a new economy is 
affecting the career trajectories of the working poor (e.g. Connolly, Gottschalk, and Newman 
2004, Cockx and Picchio 2012). In the U.S., low-end service occupations are low-wage, low 
skill, and likely dead-end jobs (Kalleberg 2011). Workers in these jobs are not expected to 
achieve higher wages over the course of their careers. Some evidence indicates that there is a 
route out of low-wage work for workers who move to and stay with firms that offer higher wages 
for low-skilled workers (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2005).  
The growth of low-end service occupations is occurring in all the advanced capitalist 
countries. Many of these countries have stronger institutions that shape the wages, working 
hours, and the careers of low-wage workers than the U.S. (Gautié and Schmitt 2010). Huber and 
Stephens (2014) find these institutional differences are related to the level of inequality in a 
country. Vocational training systems, collective bargaining agreements, and unions are 
institutions expected to shape the wages of low-end service workers. Pontusson (2011) describes 
how collective bargaining is related to wage compression in the Nordic countries. Thelen  (2004) 
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explains how vocational training systems affect skill formation and matching to jobs. 
Despite these differences, cross-national studies of the careers of low-wage workers are 
scarce. Notable exceptions are the case studies edited by Gautie and Schmidt (2010) comparing 
low-wage work in several industries for 5 countries and Salverda and Mayhew’s (2009) 
quantitative analysis of the incidence and mobility out of low-wage work in 13 countries. I begin 
to address this gap by modeling the wage mobility over the career for U.S and West German 
workers in seven low-end service occupations. My primary research question in an institutional 
question: Do strong vocational training systems lead to higher wages for low-end service 
workers over their careers? I narrow in on vocational training systems as the primary country-
level institution in this study.  
 The seven service occupations I study are large, growing, low-wage, and low-skill in the 
U.S. Working in these occupations is considered a “bad job” (Kalleberg 2011:1). Most previous 
studies of mobility out of low-wage work ignore detailed occupations (but see Mouw and 
Kalleberg 2015) and analyze all workers below a given low-wage threshold. In contrast, I study 
the wage growth of all workers entering seven occupations over the remainder of their careers: 
retail salespersons, personal & home care aides, childcare workers, cleaners, waiters & 
waitresses, hairstylists & barbers, and general office clerks. Low-wage work spans industries and 
occupations, but much of the growth in low-wage work is occurring in occupations like these at 
the bottom of the service sector.  
An occupational analysis has several benefits. It allows me to compare workers doing the 
same work by matching detailed occupations across countries. Low-wage workers in different 
countries can be in different occupations and industries. Comparing workers in the same 
occupation allows me to isolate returns to tenure in a particular occupation. The effect of 
 2 
vocational training systems is expected primarily through higher skills and occupational tenure. 
As a result, an occupational approach helps me to isolate the effect of vocational training systems 
on wage mobility.  
 
Previous Work on the Mobility of Low-wage Workers 
 Sociologists studying mobility have mostly focused on intergenerational mobility from 
parents to children following Blau and Duncan (1978) (see Diprete 2007 for a review). With 
some exceptions, most of the recent work on intragenerational mobility or the careers of workers 
in sociology comes from comparative life course sociologists like Blossfeld and colleagues in 
Germany (e.g. Blossfeld et al 2005, Blossfeld and Hofmeister 2006, Blossfeld and Bernardi 
2006). Mobility in this literature is conceptualized in terms of status attainment using 
occupational prestige scores and/or categorical groupings of a measure of socio-economic status 
(Grunow 2006). Some economists use occupational prestige to study mobility as well (Connolly, 
Gottschalk, and Newman 2003, Knabe and Plum 2010). Sociologists using a life course 
perspective to study worker’s careers follow Elder (2003) and emphasize either worker’s 
transitions into and out of unemployment (e.g. Grunow 2006) or, in the case of women’s careers, 
time out of the labor force do to having children (e.g. Aisenbrey and Grunow 2009).  
 In contrast, economists study intragenerational wage mobility in order to refine theories 
of human capital. Recent work in this area is focusing on the distinctions between firm-specific 
(Pavan 2011), industry-specific (Neal 1995) occupation-specific (Kambourov and Manovskii 
2009), and task-specific forms of human capital (Gathmann and Schöenberg 2010, and 
Yamaguchi 2012). This work seeks to better understand and test the importance of different 
types of skills for wage growth (see Sanders 2014 for a recent review). The theory is that 
workers accrue each type of human capital through tenure in a firm, industry, or occupation. 
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Occupations can be understood as bundles of tasks. Gathmann and Schöenberg (2010) use a 
three-part typology of tasks: analytical (research, design, program), manual (manufacture, clean, 
serve), and interactive (sell, teach, manage). Their approach makes a distinction between skills 
that are obsolete when changing occupations (occupation-specific) and transferable skills (task-
specific). In studies not making this distinction, measures of occupation-specific human capital 
encompass both types. The prevailing finding of this literature is that task-specific human capital 
and occupation-specific human capital are the most important for wage mobility. Firm-tenure 
produces small effects in some studies, while the effects of industry-specific human capital are 
negligible.  
 A primary interest of economists studying wage mobility is the mobility of workers out 
low-wage jobs (e.g. Stewart and Swaffield 1999, French et al 2005). A central question in this 
literature is whether low-wage jobs are stepping-stones to higher wages; in other words, that 
labor market attachment builds human capital for unemployed and low-skill workers (Connolly 
and Gottschalk 2001, Knabe and Plum 2010, Cockx and Picchio 2012). Andersson et al (2005) 
find that moving to and staying with an employer with a higher wage differential is a key path 
out of low-wage work. The importance of firms it highlighted through the distinction between 
high-road (Costco) and low-road (Walmart) employers (in the retail sector).  
While more economists are including occupational categories in their models to account 
for occupation- or task-specific human capital, these tend to be broad categories. For example: 
Aertz and Gürtzgen (2012) and Holmes and Tholen (2013) use 6 occupational categories in their 
analysis. Fedorets (2013) goes one step farther and uses 1-digit codes from the German KldB-88 
occupational classification system in addition to using a measure of task-difference at the 
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detailed 3-digit level. Yamaguchi’s (2012) recent work uses detailed 3-digit occupational codes, 
but he models the wage mobility for all workers.  
 State dependence, unobserved heterogeneity, or the problem of selection is a central 
concern of the economic literature on mobility out of low-wage work – concerns that the related 
literature on poverty in sociology is starting to take more seriously (Andriopoulou and 
Tsakloglou 2011). The problem of selection is whether workers in low-wage jobs are selected 
into low-wages due to unobserved factors “such as ‘ambition’ or ‘ability’ that affect mobility” 
(Mouw and Kalleberg 2015:5). In reviewing this literature, Mouw and Kalleberg find that 
existing studies are problematic due to untenable assumptions and propose an alternative method 
to mitigate the selection problem (2014:5). They theorize that there are two kinds of workers 
moving out of low-wage jobs: (1) workers who move up quickly and are selected on unobserved 
characteristics and (2) workers who move up more slowly due to acquiring task or occupational-
specific human capital with experience. Workers who move up due to accruing human capital 
likely do so by moving to an occupation with similar skills. By modeling the accrual of skill 
through occupational duration (positive state dependence), they mitigate the effects of selection. 
Mouw and Kalleberg’s innovative approach is bringing together the work on task-specific human 
capital and mobility out of low-wage work and applying a sociological lens.  
 In recent years, there has been a growing resurgence by sociologists in studying 
intragenerational mobility and worker’s careers. Sociologists are revitalizing an earlier literature 
that starts with Spilerman (1977) (see also Rosenfeld 1992; Abbott 2004). Maume and Wilson 
(2015) compare the wage mobility of workers aged 18 to 30 in the 1979 and 1997 cohorts in the 
National Longitudinal Study of Youth. They find that the early career wage mobility for workers 
in the millennial cohort is much slower than that experienced by the boomer cohort. Grunow’s 
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(2006) finds similar results and shows that more recent cohorts are more insecure in West 
Germany. Maume and Wilson attribute this change to the growing precarity associated with the 
transition to the new service economy.  
Newman (2008) studied the careers of workers who applied to a fast-food restaurant in 
Harlem in 1993. Starting with a sample of 294 individuals in 1993, Newman re-interviewed 103 
individuals in 1997 and 40 individuals in 2002 to learn about their career trajectories. She 
documents that some “high-flyers” achieve high wage mobility of over $5 over 4 years from 
1993 to 1997 (2008:73). Connolly, Gottschalk, and Newman (2003) use the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) to replicate Newman’s qualitative sample using a nationally 
representative dataset. They confirm Newman’s original findings. In the SIPP analysis, 11% of 
male and 13% of female metropolitan food workers from poor near poor households are high 
flyers in the 1990s. The number of high-flyers increases to 19% and 17% when all non-
management workers in poor or near poor households are included. Mouw and Kalleberg (2015) 
find a similar level of mobility out of low-wage work in the U.S. In their analysis of SIPP data, 
16% of low-wage workers making below $11 an hour escape from working poverty over a three-
year period. A pathway out of low-wage work appears to exist for some workers in the U.S., but 
most low-wage workers remain in low-wages.  
 Newman’s (2008) in-depth interviews reveal the importance of family context and the 
different pathways high-flyers take to achieve higher wages. Family support helps workers 
remain in the labor market and acquire the job tenure and career experience needed to move to 
higher wages. In Newman’s sample, stable families help individuals achieve stable employment, 
a key determinant of wage mobility. Women who were able to use family for childcare were 
more likely to remain in the labor force. Newman documents five strategies high flyers used to 
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move out of low-wage work: internal labor markets, inter-firm occupational mobility, education 
credentials, union jobs, and government jobs. The first three are forms of human capital 
development: firm-specific skills, occupation-specific skills, and by completing higher 
educational credentials. Union jobs and government jobs on the other hand offer higher-wages 
and employment stability do to the firm institutional environment, including negotiated 
collective bargaining agreements and seniority systems.  
 A comparative literature in sociology and political economy describes the importance of 
institutions for shaping work outcomes. These comparative institutional studies of work and 
careers build off the work of political economists and political scientists in the comparative 
welfare state (e.g. Huber and Stephens 2001, Esping-Anderson 1990) and varieties of capitalism 
(Hall and Sockice 2001, Thelen 2014) literatures. Gangl (2006) finds that labor market structure, 
unemployment insurance, and employment protection legislation strongly influence whether 
unemployment results in decreased wages. Mason and Salverda (2010) find that countries with 
stronger labor market institutions have lower amounts of low-wage work. This evidence 
collaborates the industry case studies in the same volume (Gautie and Schmidt 2010). Stronger 
country institutions also matter for the level inequality (Huber and Stephens 2014) and poverty 
(Brady 2009) in a country. Brady et al (2013) in a comparative study of states in the U.S. find 
that “unionization is the most important state-level influence on working poverty” (2013:889). 
This finding suggests that unionization has spillover effects beyond the direct effect of raising 
the wages of unionized workers. Iversen and Stephens (2008) and Busemeyer and Trampusch 
(2011) describe differences in education systems, including vocational training between 
countries and describe how these differences shape human capital formation.  
 Cross-national studies of wage mobility out of low-wage work are scarce. Most studies of 
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wage mobility focus on one country (Stewart and Swaffield 1999; Andersson et al 2005, Cockx 
and Picchio 2012, Holmes and Tholen 2013, Mouw and Kalleberg 2015). Exceptions are recent 
studies by Salverda and colleagues (Salverda and Mayhew 2009; Mason and Salverda 2010). 
Salverda and Mayhew (2009) is a follow-up article that builds on Mason and Salverda’s (2010) 
book chapter (published later) in Low-wage work in the wealthy world. They use data from Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics and the European Community Household Panel from 1994 to 2001 
to study the mobility out of low-pay work in 14 countries, including the U.S. and Germany. 
Low-pay work is defined as work below 2/3rd the median income. Salverda and Mayhew (2009) 
find that from 1995 to 2001, the percentage of low-pay workers moving out of low-pay is 41% in 
the U.S. and 25.6% in Germany. Their analysis indicates that there is a weak relationship 
between the incidence of low-pay in a country and the mobility rate out of low-pay.  
 
Research Design 
 I first model wage growth over the career for workers in 7 low-end service occupations in 
the U.S. and West Germany. I use quantile regression to explore the variation in wage 
trajectories of workers at the bottom, middle, and top of the distribution. I then model upward 
mobility of workers in these low-end service occupations out of the bottom two quintiles of the 
full-time hourly wage distribution for both countries. Comparing the results from the U.S. and 
West Germany allows me to answer my primary research question: do strong vocational training 
systems increase the wages of low-end service workers over their careers? The U.S. and 
Germany are good cases to answer this question about the advanced capitalist countries. The 
vocational training system in the U.S. is weak and mostly non-existent in the service sector, 
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while the vocational training system is strong a central part of the German education system even 
in the service sector (Thelen 2004; Protsch and Solga 2015).  
 I make two primary contributions to the existing literature: (1) I compare the effect of 
vocational training systems on the wage growth and upward mobility of low-wage workers; and 
(2) I use detailed occupations to model wage growth and upward mobility over the career. Most 
previous research on mobility out of low-wage work is of a single country and does not study 
institutional differences across countries. Recent work using detailed occupations to study 
mobility focused on mobility between pairs of occupations and not over the career (see Mouw 
and Kalleberg 2015). Furthermore, my cross-national comparison moves forward the debate over 
whether low-wage work is a stepping stone or a trap by explaining the effect of vocational 
training systems on wage mobility.  
 
An Occupational Approach 
 I selected the 7 occupations in the study because they are large, growing occupations with 
low wages and education requirements in the U.S. (see Table 1). These 7 occupations are meant 
as a descriptive look at growing low-end service occupations and are not intended to be an 
exhaustive list. Occupations are harmonized across U.S. and German occupational systems. The 
result is some detailed occupations in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data are combined 
together to make the harmonized occupations shown in Table 1. For example, the occupation 
personal and home care aides in the study combines the occupational categories of personal care 
aides and home care aides from the BLS classification system together (see Appendix A for 
more on the harmonization process).    
 There are several benefits of using detailed occupations to analyze the wage mobility of 
low-wage workers. First, detailed occupations allow me to study whether occupational tenure 
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translates into higher wages. Human capital theorists predict that workers accrue occupation-
specific and task-specific skills by working in a given occupation (Gathmann and Schöenberg 
2010). Higher occupation-specific skills could result in higher wages as workers are rewarded for 
higher skills and productivity. Occupations are bundles of tasks and as such some occupations 
can be arranged on a gradient of similarity in task-specific skills. The stepping stone argument is 
that low-wage workers can accrue task-specific skills and then move to an occupation with 
similar tasks. If this new occupation pays higher wages, then this is a route to upward mobility. 
The trap or dead-end hypothesis is that workers in low-wage occupations are low-skill and so 
workers do not accrue any valuable occupation- or task-specific skills. As a result, workers will 
remain in or churn between similar low-wage, low-skill occupations. The workers who achieve 
upward mobility in the dead-end job scenario do so by moving to an occupation with a dissimilar 
skill profile.  
 Second, studying the mobility of all workers in an occupation highlights the possible 
variation within a particular occupation. An occupation could be a stepping-stone for some types 
of workers and not others. While on the whole these are low-wage occupations, some workers in 
these occupations may have higher wages possibly as a result of a ‘high-road’ firm strategy. The 
literature has often studied the hardest case (the lowest paid workers) to answer questions of 
human capital theory and overlooked the variation within the occupations where the low-wage 
jobs are. 
Finally, when comparing across countries it is important to use detailed occupations to 
compare the same work. While growth in low-end services in a cross-national phenomenon, the 
shape of labor markets differs across countries. Low-wage workers may be in different  
occupations and industries. Detailed occupations allow me to isolate the same work and compare  
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Demographic	
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Wage	
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from	General	
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Working	
Hours	
Wage	Growth	
Over	Career	
	 					Institutional	Environment		 					Education	and	Vocational	Training	System		 					Unions	and	Collective	Bargaining	Agreements		 					Minimum	Wage	Laws		 					Labor	Market	Structure		 						
Period	and	Cohort		
Vocational	
Training	and	
Credentialing	
	
Accumulated	
Human	Capital	Occupation-Specific	Firm-Specific	Task-Specific		
Job	
Match		
Job	
Movement	
Over	Career	
Table 1: Wage, employment growth, and modal education for 7 large, growing low-wage occupations in the U.S	
Figure 1: Wage mobility conceptual framework 
SOC 
2010 
Code Harmonized Occupation Title
Median 
Hourly 
Wage1
Annual 
Median 
Wage1
Total Emp. 
2012 
(1000s) 2
Total Est. 
Emp. 2022 
(1000s) 2
2012-2022 
Growth 
(1000s) 2
2012-2022 
Growth %2 Typical Education3
39-9021 Personal and Home Care Aides $9.85 $21,423 1,032.9 1,535.4 502.5 48.7% High School Diploma or Less
35-3021 Waiters and Waitresses $8.87 $23,549 2,665.8 2,942.6 276.9 10.4% High School Diploma or Less
39-9011 Childcare Workers $9.42 $22,480 1,312.7 1,496.8 184.1 14.0% High School Diploma
37-2012 Cleaners $10.45 $20,044 1,879.3 2,111.0 231.7 12.3% High School Diploma
39-5012 Hairstylists and Barbers $11.16 $28,040 663.3 746.6 83.4 12.6% Post-Secondary Certificate
41-2031 Retail Salespersons $10.16 $21,140 4,447.0 4,881.7 434.7 9.8% High School Diploma
43-9061 Office Clerks, General $13.49 $22,160 2,983.5 3,167.6 184.1 6.2% High School Diploma
1  Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) May 2013 2  BLS Employment Projections 2012-2022 3  BLS O*Net
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how the careers of workers differ across institutional contexts. 
 
 
Conceptual Framework  
 My conceptual framework is presented in Figure 1. Wage growth over a worker’s career 
is a result of accumulated human capital and institutional environment and varies by 
demographic characteristics that reflect different choices, privilege, and discrimination. Human 
capital is accumulated through education and work experience. Full-time workers accrue more 
human capital than part-time workers and this is reflected in starting wages and wage growth. A 
worker’s choice to move occupations and/or firms influences her wage growth over her career. 
Staying with the same firm or occupation will likely return rewards to gained skill. Moving firms 
within the same occupation likely results in higher wages as firms compete for a worker’s skills.  
Moving occupations could result in higher wages if the destination occupation utilizes a worker’s 
accumulated task-specific skills. It could also result in lower wages if firm-specific human 
capital is not-transferrable when moving to a new firm or if the worker moves to an occupation 
with dissimilar task-specific skill requirements. 
 Gender, race, and immigrant statuses influence human capital formation through 
differential educational attainment, labor market attachment, and discrimination. The number of 
children in the household and whether the worker is the head of the household combine with 
gender to influence whether a worker works part-time or exits the labor force. Worker 
preferences and household types are different between the U.S. and Germany and could be a 
primary source of differences in wage mobility between countries. Discrimination might result in 
a higher probability that minority groups experience more spells of unemployment do to bad job 
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matches. The social construction of racial and ethnic categories varies significantly between the 
U.S. and Germany. This makes comparisons difficult and problematic.  
 The institutional environment is an important feature that shapes how individuals are 
matched to jobs and the wages and wage mobility they obtain over the course of their careers. 
Labor market institutions aren’t independent. The presence of unions affects the education 
system. A strong vocational education system can reinforce support for collective bargaining 
agreements. The structure of the labor force shapes the jobs available and is shaped by the supply 
of workers with different skills. Institutions change over time and affect a worker’s steps from 
education to job, to job trajectories and wages over her career. The education system affects the 
type of human capital created from education and vocational training. Unions and collective 
bargaining agreements affect the matching of workers to jobs and their starting wages and 
expected working hours.  
The shift to the new economy is changing the structure of the labor market. The shifting 
occupation structure may be increasing the supply of available workers to low-end service work 
even as the size of these occupations increases. As a result, wages may be driven down over time 
relative to rising median wages without intervention from strong minimum wage laws or 
collective bargaining agreement. Economic conditions could operate as period effects. Connolly, 
Gottschalk, and Newman (2003) present evidence that the number of high-flyers is stable across 
different economic environments. 
 Age and cohort effects are expected. A worker in earlier cohort experiencing 
unemployment due to the transitioning economy in mid-life may remain stuck in low-wage work 
if his previous skills are obsolete. More recent cohorts are receiving higher levels of education. 
This potentially improves their ability to move between jobs until finding a good firm or 
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occupation match in which to accrue firm- or occupation-specific human capital. In Germany, 
the deterioration of collective bargaining agreements could be having a downward effect on 
wages and the skill profiles of low-end service occupations with more recent cohorts. 
 
Vocational Training in the U.S. and Germany 
 The strength of the German vocational education and training (VET) system has 
traditionally been in the craft and manufacturing sector. However, by 1980 half of the 
apprenticeships in West Germany were in service occupations (Protsch and Solga 2015). So, the 
German vocational training system began several decades ago to adapt to the service expansion. 
In 2011, Protsch and Solga the number of apprenticeships in service occupations had increased 
to 59% in West Germany. The increase from 1980 to 2011 is mostly the result of a decline in the 
number of apprenticeships in crafts and manufacturing and is not due to a growth in the number 
of apprenticeships in the services. A lingering weakness of the German VET system is an 
inability to attract more employers in the service sector to take on apprenticeships. As a result, a 
growing proportion of students (22% in 2013) where in a school-based only VET program that 
consists of occupations in agriculture, trades, and domestic services (Protsch and Solga 2015). So 
many of the workers in the low-end service occupations in this study are expected to have 
vocational training credentials. 
 The U.S. vocational training system is weak and almost non-existent when it comes to 
service occupations. A notable exception is the apprenticeships in U.S. auto industry. The U.S. 
education system develops general skills and then relies upon on-the-job training (Iversen and 
Stephens 2008). Occupational licensing can serve a similar function as vocational training by 
requiring specific training. Hairstylists and barbers are an example of a low-end service 
occupation in my sample with strong occupational licensing in the U.S.  
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 My primary research question is an institutional question. I am interested in the overall 
effect of the vocational training systems (following Allmendinger 1989) on workers’ wages. A 
strong vocational training systems should increase wages by increasing occupational tenure and 
occupation-specific skills. There are two theories for why strong vocational training systems 
would increase occupational tenure. The first is a strong vocational training system results in a 
more structured and credentialed labor market (Protsch and Solga 2015). This results in more 
barriers to entry into jobs which limits occupational mobility and increases occupational tenure. 
A second theory is a strong vocational training system creates a better match between workers’ 
skills and jobs. The better match is expected to result in workers voluntarily staying longer in 
their current position which will increase occupational tenure. However, Witte and Kalleberg 
(1995) found that workers with apprenticeships in Germany were less likely to report that their 
training matched their job. They theorize that this is because apprenticeships provide general 
skills, as opposed to specific skills as predicted by this theory. General skills are more applicable 
when changing occupations which is how Witte and Kalleberg explain why apprenticeships 
provide more opportunity for occupational mobility. Witte and Kalleberg’s findings suggest that 
job match for workers may not be as significant a factor in increasing occupational tenure.  
 Another way stronger vocational training systems could increase wages and wage growth 
for low-end service workers by up-skilling traditionally low-skill occupations. Employers could 
arrange the tasks within an occupation to increase the skill profile of the job in order to match the 
increased training. One approach would be to give workers’ more autonomy and responsibility in 
job tasks. Increasing the skill profile of the job could result in higher wages and higher wage 
growth for returns to skill over time. Similar to the approach of a high-road firm strategy, 
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increasing the skill of these occupations could lower employee turnover and reduce the number 
of needed employees and offset the cost to employers of paying workers higher wages.  
 A stronger vocational training system could also more effectively sort workers into jobs 
(Arrow 1973). Students in Germany are tracked after grade 4 or 6 into the lower secondary 
school (Hauptschule), intermediate secondary school (Realschule), or upper secondary to obtain 
the university entrance degree (Arbitur). There is a strong relationship between secondary school 
degree and the type of vocational training program a student is able to enter (Protsch and Solga 
2015). If this sorting is meritocratic, then it could be that those workers with the least aptitude 
end up with the lowest credentials and in the lowest-paid jobs -  like the low-end service 
occupations in this study. In contrast, in a country like the U.S., where the education system is 
more open and focused on general skills, there may be more opportunity for a person to be 
wrongly sorted based on their education credential. As a result, more workers with higher ability 
could find their way into low-wage jobs. Higher ability workers would be expected to have a 
much higher rate of upward mobility. An employer is more likely to promote a worker with 
higher ability faster. Similarly, a worker may realize she has higher ability and be able to find a 
different job that better matches her skills. So, a higher mobility out of low wage work in a 
country with a less structured labor market could be because more workers with high ability 
become low-wage workers before moving on to jobs that better match their skills.  
   
Other Important Institutional Differences 
 There are several other important institutional differences between the U.S. and West 
Germany other than the vocational training system that may affect the mobility of low-end 
service workers. Recent work integrates the varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001) and 
welfare state typologies (Esping-Andersen 1990 to create three ideal types of advanced capitalist 
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countries: a Nordic type (e.g. Sweden, Denmark), a Liberal type (U.S., U.K.), and a Continental 
type (e.g. Germany, France) (see Huber and Stephens 2001, Schröder 2009). The Nordic 
countries are known for their universal welfare state and strong unions. Thelen (2014) describes 
how even when Nordic countries liberalize they do so in a way that strengthens social solidarity 
rather than creating duality. In the Liberal countries, unions and employment protections are 
weak and the welfare state uses a market logic that results in targeted, means tested benefits.  
 Continental countries are known for traditionally strong unions that negotiate strong 
collective bargaining agreements for higher wages, leave and other benefits, and employment 
security. The welfare state is Bismarkian and built around a male breadwinner model with 
employers making important contributions to the system along with the government. Palier 
(2010) finds that union membership and collective bargaining coverage are waning in the 
continental countries. Gautie and Schmidt (2010) find low-paying work is growing. The result of 
these changes is labor market dualization or segmentation where labor market insiders obtain 
high wages and employment security and outsiders work in low-wage, flexible arrangements 
(Palier 2010; Thelen 2014). The Continental welfare state faces challenges in adapting its male 
breadwinner- orientated model to the needs of workers to balance work and family and to 
mitigate the greater risks of unemployment in the new economy, particularly for single parent 
households (O’Connor 2015). In response, new reforms to the welfare state in Continental 
countries have introduced targeted programs with lower benefit levels and work requirements. 
Palier (2010) describes this reform as creating a dualization in the welfare state with different 
benefits for labor market insiders and outsiders.  
 The U.S. is a prototypical Liberal country in the typology. Unionization rates continue to 
decline, particularly in the private sector. Service workers have proven difficult for unions to 
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organize and so most workers in low-end service occupations are not in a union or covered by a 
union contract. Minimum wage laws are the primary institution shaping the wages of low-end 
service workers in the U.S. As a result of not being indexed to inflation, most increases in the 
minimum wage occur on an ad hoc basis at politically opportune moments. The federal 
minimum wage has deteriorated over the last several decades and was particularly low in the 
1980s. States are able to set their own minimum wages many of which are higher the federal 
minimum wage.   
 Union strength has been historically strong in Germany, but the percentage of workers in 
a union is now less than a third of the workforce (Pontusson 2011). Nevertheless, industry-wide 
collective bargaining agreements still cover most workers in Germany. These agreements should 
have the same effect as minimum wage laws in the U.S. and raise the wage floor for low-end 
service workers. In recent years, these collective bargaining agreements have begun to erode. 
Sub-contracting to contractors not covered by the agreements has become more common in the 
low-wage sector. Germany used tax policy to create untaxed ‘mini-jobs’ for part-time workers at 
a fixed low-wage rate (Gautie and Schmidt 2010). Many women who are the secondary earners 
in their household find these mini-jobs attractive. These changes help explain the growth of low-
wage work in Germany since the 1990s (Salverda and Mayhew 2009). In response, Germany 
approved the country’s first minimum wage in 2014.  
  A major difference for low-end service workers in the U.S. in Germany is their ability to 
get health insurance. All Germans receive health insurance through a de-centralized system of 
sickness funds that receive employer, employee, and government contributions (Huber and 
Stephens 2001). Most workers in the U.S. have health insurance through their employers. The 
tax structure incentivizes this practice by not taxing employer contributions to health insurance. 
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As a result, employers offer benefits to medium- and high-wage workers instead of wage 
increases. However, most low-end service workers lack employer-sponsored health insurance 
and other benefits including retirement, paid sick leave and vacation time (Kalleberg 2011). 
Because the jobs are low-wage and low-skill, employers gain little from offering benefits and 
workers lack the power to bargain for higher wages and/or benefits. Workers without health 
insurance through their employer can buy insurance through the market or be covered through a 
spouse’s employer plan, but at a high cost. The passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010 has 
begun to remedy some of these gaps in coverage. 
 Another important difference between the U.S. and Germany is women’s labor force 
participation and attachment. In this U.S., the dual-breadwinner model is the norm with most 
women working full-time (O’Connor 2015). However, homophily in marriage and partnership is 
common in the U.S. This means that low-end service workers are likely to be partnered with a 
worker with a similar level of education and earning power. Women in Germany are more likely 
to work part-time than their U.S. counterparts and are more likely to rely upon their partner as 
their primary breadwinner. O’Connor (2015) calls this the one and a half breadwinner model 
with women working part-time as the half part of the model. This raises the possibility that many 
more women in Germany are choosing to take low-paying service jobs, as typified by the tax-
incentivized mini-job for part-time work, for reasons of fit or work-family balance. For these 
workers, developing their skills and achieving higher wages over their careers may not be the 
goal. So, low-end service workers in Germany could be better off then their American 
counterparts even if they have lower wage mobility. In this type of arrangement, the low-wages 
and lack of some benefits of a low-end service job could be offset by flexibility in work 
schedule. Furthermore, if her partner earns higher wages and receives benefits, then a low-end 
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service worker in Germany could have a higher household income and greater household 
economic security than a similar worker in the U.S.  
 In this paper, I study the wage growth and wage mobility of low-end service workers in 
the U.S. and Germany. However, the welfare state literature reminds us that wages are only part 
of the story. Studying wages masks cross-national variation in health insurance and other 
benefits. So, low-wages or even similar rates of mobility do not necessarily mean that low-end 
service jobs are equally bad for the individual workers across countries. As Kalleberg (2007) 
points out, workers may choose jobs that fit their needs for flexibility, geographic proximity, 
interests, or many other characteristics. Comparing other aspects of job quality, including 
subjective measures like job satisfaction and objective measures like task repetition and benefits, 
is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Furthermore, low-wages do not necessarily equate to poverty. Households share income 
and resources and make shared labor market choices. So, poverty and other measures of relative 
deprivation are measured at the household level. Low-wages are also more likely to lead to 
poverty in the absence of health insurance and other benefits. Using household budgets or other 
methods to incorporate households is also beyond the present analysis. However, cross-national 
researchers of low-wage work should seek to address this problem in future research. 
 
Hypotheses and the Problem of Selection 
  I hypothesize that the strong vocational training system in Germany will result in longer 
occupational tenure for workers in low-end service occupations than in the U.S. I theorize that 
this longer tenure results from barriers to occupational mobility due to the high level of 
credentialing as a result of the vocational training system. Longer occupation tenure should allow 
workers to accrue more occupation-specific skills and result in higher wages. If the vocational 
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training system has resulted in these occupations being up-skilled, then I expect a higher starting 
wage and a higher rate of wage growth for low-end service workers in Germany. Stronger 
collective bargaining agreements in Germany could also account for a higher wage floor in 
Germany than in the U.S. A similar rate of wage growth in the same occupation across countries 
would indicate that the returns to a year of experience are the same.  
 Workers with longer occupational tenure in a low-end service occupation develop more 
task-specific skills. So, I expect that workers with longer occupational tenure should be more 
likely to use the low-end service occupation as a stepping-stone to a better paying occupation. 
Since occupational tenure is higher in Germany, the use of low-end service occupations as 
stepping-stones should be higher in Germany. I am not able to directly test the skill similarity 
between a worker’s origin low-end service occupation and the destination occupation for 
worker’s who moves occupations. I plan to incorporate such a test in future work. However, if a 
longer occupational tenure in a low-end service occupation increases wage growth for a worker 
after she moves to a new occupation, this is evidence that there was some benefit to tenure in the 
low-end service occupation. While indirect, returns to occupational tenure in a low-end service 
occupation suggest this occupation was used as a stepping-stone.  
 High rates of movement out of a low-end service occupation could be an indication that 
workers understand the job as a dead-end with limited opportunity for upward mobility. In this 
case, a vocational training system that limits mobility between occupations may further trap low-
end service workers in low-wage jobs. If low-end service occupations are dead-ends, there are 
several ways to account for the workers who achieve upward mobility. First, select workers 
could be using the occupation as a transition to the labor market. For example, a recent college 
graduates could enter a low-end service occupation to pay the bills while they look for a better 
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job. Younger workers and overqualified workers (with a college degree) are the most likely to 
use low-end service jobs as a temporary transition. These workers are expected to move quickly 
to an occupation that more closely matches their education and pays higher wages. The 
occupations these workers move to are likely to be highly dissimilar in the task profile when 
compared to low-end service occupations.  
 Second, workers could realize these occupations are dead-end and increase their 
education to achieve higher wages. Similar to the workers using the job as transition to the labor 
market, after increasing their education they are likely to move quickly to another occupational 
that utilizes their new credential. Finally, workers selected on unobserved characteristics like 
ambition or ability not captured by education credentials are more likely to upwardly mobile. As 
described earlier, the upward mobility on unobserved characteristics could be higher in the U.S. 
if the vocational training system in Germany more effectively sorts workers with unobserved 
characteristics into the different schools where they obtain different credentials and job 
opportunities. Workers with unobserved skills should achieve wage growth and mobility more 
quickly as employers recognize and reward their skills in the same occupation or workers 
recognize their ability and move to a job that is better suites their skills and ability.  
 If low-end service occupations are dead-end jobs than workers who achieve mobility do 
so quickly and move to occupations more dissimilar skills profiles. This fits with Mouw and 
Kalleberg’s (2015) theoretical framing and analytic approach to dealing with the problem of 
selection on unobserved characteristics. They define a “dead-end job” as one where the accrual 
of skill does not result in increased probabilities of mobility (Mouw and Kalleberg 2015:10). 
In my models, I control for current education level and increases in education attainment. 
I cannot control away selection based on unobserved characteristics. Yet, by looking for a 
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positive duration dependence leading to wage growth or mobility, some of risk of bias from 
selection on unobserved characteristics is mitigated. This is because the biasing effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity is downward, so any positive duration dependence is not a result on 
unobserved heterogeneity. Mouw and Kalleberg use a measure of skill similarity between pairs 
of occupations to verify that higher wage mobility after occupational change is a result skill 
transfer. I recently obtained a comparable measure of skill similarity between pairs of 
occupations in Germany, but have not yet been able to incorporate this measure into my analysis. 
However, by seeing if there is an effect for occupational tenure in the initial occupation on wage 
growth or mobility, my analysis can suggest whether workers moving occupations and achieving 
mobility are using low-end service occupations as stepping-stones.   
 
Data and Methods 
 The data for my analysis come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the 
U.S. and the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for Germany. I use the odd years of the survey from 
1985 through 2007. The PSID moved to surveying respondents every other year starting after 
1997. Occupational and firm moves are central to my analysis and so I drop the even years so all 
moves are observed over equal two-year periods. 1985 corresponds to the first odd year of 
available data from the German SOEP. Since I do not have data that extends through and beyond 
the global financial crisis I end my analysis in 2007 in order to not introduce the effects of the 
crisis into my analysis. Workers enter my sample when they enter one of the 7 low-end service 
occupations in the study during the odd years of the observation period from 1985 to 2007. I 
exclude all workers from East Germany because of the different wage structure in East Germany 
and the lack of observations spanning the whole observation window. A limitation of the 
analysis I present in this paper is the high degree of missing data. This is true particularly on my 
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key variable of interest hourly wages (calculated from monthly earnings and average hours 
worked a week) as well as covariates like firm tenure. My analysis could be improved by using 
multiple imputation to address this issue.  
 I use hourly wages to account for differences in full-time working hours between 
countries. I normalize each worker’s hourly wages to the country median hourly wage using a 3-
year rolling average of all workers in the PSID and SOEP. An alternative approach is the use the 
Purchasing Power Parity that compares the buying power of different currencies based on a 
standard basket of goods. However, this measure has been criticized because what goods people 
buy varies across countries based on difference in consumption behavior. Using the median 
hourly wage to normalize wages is more akin to relative poverty measures as it measures the 
relative distance to a median person in the country. This is appropriate since the concern over 
low-wages is usually that they produce working poverty.   
 The U.S. and German education systems are structured differently. I use a 3-category 
schema to harmonize education credentials across countries. The first category is workers with a 
secondary school education or less and no vocational training. In the U.S., this includes workers 
with a high school diploma or equivalent or less and workers with some college, but no college 
degree or vocational training credential. The second category is workers with a secondary school 
education and vocational training. In the U.S., this includes workers with a high school diploma 
or equivalent or less and all workers with a vocational training credential, but no college degree. 
The final category is all workers with a college or university degree or higher. In the U.S., this 
includes workers with an Associate’s degree. I follow Solga (2004) in highlighting the 
distinction between workers in Germany with and without vocational training credentials. Solga 
finds that these workers are stigmatized much like high school dropouts are in the U.S. with 
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employers not considering workers without the requisite credential. I include this education 
variable in all my models, but I do not expect that workers with or without vocational training 
will achieve higher wage growth or upward mobility. This is because education credentials are 
used to sort workers into jobs. Since I am selecting all workers already in low-end service 
occupations, I do not expect differential returns to education. I do expect that workers with 
college degrees, who are likely using as transitional jobs into the labor market, will achieve 
higher wage growth and upward mobility.  
 The focal part of my analysis is modeling human capital acquisition. I include whether a 
worker is working part-time or full-time, since part-time workers accrue less human capital from 
experience. I model increases in education and a spells of unemployment two years previously, 
since educational credentials and unemployment spells are important signals to employers of 
skills and employability. I am not able to account for the reason for unemployment spells. As 
such, workers who are unemployed could also be out of the labor force by choice, for example a 
parent could be taking time out of the labor force with young children, or as a result of job loss.  
 Since I dropped all the even years of the data due to the survey gap in the PSID, two 
years ago is the previous observation in the sample. As a result, my measures of occupational 
tenure, firm tenure, and occupational and firm moves are measured over 2 year intervals. I 
distinguish between occupational tenure in the initial low-end service occupation and 
occupational tenure in the current occupation where appropriate. In the wage growth models, I 
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary firm and occupation changes. Voluntary changes 
are changes where workers obtain the same wage level or an increase in the new occupation or 
firm, while involuntary are changes with a wage decrease. The two-year gap in measurement 
likely means that some workers experienced unobserved spells of unemployment between firm 
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or occupation changes. Workers are unlikely to move jobs and reduce their wages voluntarily. 
However, some workers may choose a new job for reasons of job match that I cannot account 
for. In the wage growth models, I allow for the occupation and firm change effects to last for 2 
observation periods (4 years) as workers may receive a wage increase or decrease when changing 
occupations or firms that would then dissipate over time.  
 I model variation among demographic groups and household status. I include measures of 
age started in the given low-end service occupation, gender, race or ethnic group, martial status, 
a dummy for children in the household, and a dummy for not married with children. The race or 
ethnicity variables differ for West Germany and the U.S. In the U.S. models, I use a dummy 
variable for white or non-white. In West German models, I use a dummy variable for Western 
European ethnicity or not. I include these variables in an attempt to see whether dominant racial 
or ethnic groups enjoy privilege or status of higher wage mobility even out of low-wage work. 
The household composition variables are important to control for differences in household 
composition between countries. Women (and particularly married women with children) are 
more likely to work part-time in West Germany than in the U.S.  
 I first present results from a pooled analysis of all 7 low-end service occupations. Results 
are available for each occupation individually. The trends I describe characterize them all. While 
pooled, movement out of the low-end service occupation could include moving to one of the 
other 6 occupations in the sample. I achieve this by isolating all workers in a given low-end 
service occupation and creating the requisite variables for occupational tenure and occupational 
moves. I then combine these separate datasets together for the analysis. As a result, some 
workers may be represented in the data more than once if they entered more than once of the 
low-wage occupations during the observation window. 
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 I present two methods to answer my research question: quantile regression of wage 
growth and discrete-time event history analysis of upward mobility. I make use of quantile 
regression as a form of growth curve analysis. A growth curve model predicts the average 
worker across the attributes in the model. In contrast, quantile regression allows me to model 
wage growth of low-end service workers at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. I include estimates 
from a growth curve analysis along with the quantile regression estimates in Appendix B. 
Quantile regression allows me to explore how wage growth trajectories differ at the bottom, 
middle, and top of the distribution.  
There are three benefits of using a wage growth method over the event history mobility 
method. First, I am able to include all workers in the 7 occupations in my analysis. The mobility 
method requires using a wage threshold and as a result all workers must start below the 
threshold, which hides variation within the occupation in terms of wages. Second, using a 
threshold hides differences in starting position relative to the threshold. As Salverda and 
Mayhew (2009) note, low-pay workers in some countries like the U.S. start much farther from 
the threshold than workers in other countries. Third, the growth curve method allows me to 
differentiate between factors influencing the level and slope. I first model the wage growth of 
workers while they remain in the initial low-end service occupation. I then separately model the 
wage growth of workers who move occupations after the change occupations and through all 
remaining observations in the survey data. These models predict logged normalized hourly 
wages. Separate models for wage growth for workers in the initial occupation and after a move 
from the initial occupation allow me to more clearly show the effects occupational tenure (and 
by extension the vocational training system) on wage growth.  
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 In the second set of models, I present results from a discrete-time event history analysis 
predicting mobility out of the bottom two hourly wage quintiles for low-end service workers. 
The primary benefit of this method is the same as the weakness I cited above. By isolating only 
workers at the bottom of the hourly wage distribution, I am better able to discern the effects of 
occupational tenure for achieving upward mobility into the middle of the distribution. In 
addition, I model the effect of the time in the initial occupation and occupational moves on 
upward mobility. The benefit of event history method over logistic regression is the ability to 
control for right censoring due to sample attrition. This allows me to distinguish between 
stepping stone and trap forms of mobility.  
I use the hourly wage distribution for full-time workers in the PSID and SOEP to create 
quintiles. I conceptualize upward mobility as receiving the wages of a standard worker and so I 
use the distribution for full-time workers. The result is a threshold that is higher than the 
traditional cut-off of 2/3rds the median wage for low-wage work. The bottom quintile cut-off is 
73.5% and the second quintile cut-off is the median hourly wage (100%) for all workers in U.S. 
The cut-offs for W. Germany are 73.3% for the bottom quintile and 91.6% for the second 
quintile. The higher second quintile cut-off point for the U.S. is likely a reflection a larger gap in 
hourly wages between part-time and full-time workers in the U.S. than in W. Germany. Wage 
compression due to a higher wage floor from collective bargaining agreements is a possible 
explanation. In the future, I plan to re-do my analysis for different wage thresholds to check the 
robustness of my results.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for workers starting in the 7 low-end service 
occupations in the U.S. and West Germany. As expected, the occupation duration or tenure is 
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much shorter than in the U.S. The median worker in these occupations in the U.S. stays in the 
occupation less than 2 years. In Germany, the median worker stays much longer at 6 to 8 years. I 
use survival analysis to model these occupational durations to account for right censoring. 
Waiters and waitresses are the one occupation of the 7 in Germany with similar occupation 
duration as the U.S. This is possibly a result a higher percentage of young, college educated 
workers using this occupation as a transitional job. Similarly, education credentials differ as 
expected with most U.S. workers in these occupations having a high school education or less 
without vocational training. In Germany, it is reversed with most having secondary school with 
some vocational training credential. There are a mildly higher percentage of workers in these 
occupations in Germany with a college or university degree (12% to 8%). This suggests that 
more workers use low-end service jobs as transitional in W. Germany than the U.S.   
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for workers starting in low-end service occupations 
 
 
 
 Perhaps most surprisingly, the mean normalized hourly wages are about the same. The 
variation in wages is much higher in the U.S. This is likely a result of the difference wage 
U.S. W.	Ger.
N 3431 2041
Median	Occ.	Duration	(years) 0	to	2 6	to	8
Mean	Normalized	Wage 62	(44) 61	(31)
Mean	Age	Started	in	Occupation 35	(12) 34	(12)
%	Female 75% 81%
%	Part-time 57% 62%
%	Secondary	School	or	Less 74% 28%
%	Secondary	School	&		Voc.	Training 18% 60%
%	Union	Member 10% 15%
%	Firm	Change 2% 6%
%	Not	Married	w/	Children 22% 14%
%	Nonwestern	European	(Ger.) -- 18%
%	Non-white	(U.S.) 47% --
%	Married 57% 59%
%	Single 26% 29%
%	Children	in	Household 58% 49%
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structures in each country. Wages in West Germany are more compressed towards the median 
than in the U.S. Union membership is higher in West Germany, but not by a large amount. It is 
coverage under collective bargaining agreements, not union membership directly that is expected 
to matter for wages and benefits. The demographic composition is similar. There are a somewhat 
higher proportion of female and part-time workers in Germany. The average age workers start in 
one of these low-end service occupations is around the same age at 34 or 35. There is similar 
variation in age at start in both countries. More workers in the U.S. are in the precarious status of 
being not married with children. Conceptualizing racial or ethnic disadvantage is difficult in the 
German (and European) context. As a proxy I use, Nonwestern European ethnicity under the 
theory that being a member of the dominant group results in privilege. A much higher percentage 
of workers in the U.S. are of a minority racial group.  
 The results in Table 2 show that occupational mobility is lower in West Germany (at least 
for workers in low-end service occupations) than in the U.S. Does lower occupational mobility 
result in lower wage mobility? Table 3 shows the level of mobility out of the bottom two 
quintiles of the hourly wage distribution at 4 years and 10 year intervals for workers in low-end 
service occupations. I use the hourly wage distribution for full-time workers. For a comparison 
point, I compare the mobility of all earners in the bottom two quintiles in the SOEP and PSID to 
those in the low-end service occupations. Note that these estimates require a worker to have 
wage observations at 4 years and 10 years reducing the sample size. An alternative approach 
would be to measure mobility in 4 years and 10 years using failure analysis. Time zero for low-
end service workers in the year they were first observed in the occupation. Time zero for all 
earners in the bottom two quintiles is any observation of an hourly wage in the bottom two 
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quintiles with a valid wage at 4 and 10 years respectively. For the all earners measure, I 
randomly selected one interval per person.  
 For this analysis and the upward mobility analysis to follow, I necessarily exclude 
workers in these occupations whose starting wages are in the third quintile or above. 10.13% of 
West German and 6.75% of U.S. workers in my sample are excluded for these analyses. It is 
important to remember that all workers in low-end service occupations are not homogenous and 
some of them do not receive low wages. Again, the difference between the countries in this 
regard is somewhat smaller than might be expected given Germany’s collective bargaining 
agreements. I include both a measure of occupational tenure in the initial low-end service 
occupation as well as time since moving occupations.  
 
Table 3: Mobility out of bottom two quintiles of the full-time hourly wage distribution 
 
 
The upward mobility for all earners in the bottom two quintiles is similar in the U.S. and 
West Germany. Despite more limited occupational mobility, there does not appear to be more 
limited upward mobility for all earners in the bottom two quintiles. In a related estimate, 
Salverda and Mayhew (2009) find an overall mobility rate of 41% in the U.S using the PSID 
from 1994 to 2001 (7 years) with a low-wage threshold of the 2/3rds of the median wage. My 
estimate is in line with theirs given the higher threshold and longer time period. Their estimate 
for Germany over the same period using data from the European Community Household Panel is 
At	4	Years N % N %
Low-end	Service	Workers 1,768 19% 1,281 13%
All	Earners 8,291 24% 8,261 24%
At	10	Years N % N %
Low-end	Service	Workers 972 28% 545 21%
All	Earners 5,745 41% 5,469 44%
U.S. W.	Ger.
U.S. W.	Ger.
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much lower than my estimate at 25.6% in 7 years. The discrepancy could be because Salverda 
and Mayhew use data from East and West Germany. Lower rates of mobility in East Germany 
could be expected because wages are lower in East Germany, but the median wage for the whole 
country is likely little moved because the population of West Germany is many times larger. 
Upward mobility is higher in the U.S. than in W. Germany for low-end service workers 
by 6% at 4 years, which increases to 7% at 10 years. In both countries and at both intervals, 
upward mobility is much lower for low-end service workers than all earners in the bottom 
quintiles. An explanation for this difference is that many young workers in a wide range of 
occupations start their careers with hourly wages in the bottom 40% of the distribution. As these 
workers gain experience in the labor market their hourly wage rate goes up moving them up the 
wage distribution. The upward mobility gap between U.S. and W. German low-end service 
workers holds steady at 10 years. So, the first fours years are where the upward mobility gap is 
created between countries. The longer occupational tenure in low-end service occupations in W. 
Germany is the likely cause. So, these initial descriptive findings support the theory that a strong 
vocational training system limits the upward mobility out of workers in low-end service 
occupations by increasing occupational duration.  
 There are other possible explanations for this upward mobility gap between the U.S. and 
W. Germany. These include differences the demographic composition of these occupations, the 
greater prevalence of part-time work in W. Germany potentially indicating worker choice, and 
selection of unobserved characteristics. I begin to address some of these concerns using quantile 
wage growth models. Figures 2 and 3 present the predicted normalized wage growth over time 
(years) in a low-end service occupation and after moving occupations. I use quantile analysis to 
describe how these trends differ across the bottom (25th), middle (50th), and top (50th) of the 
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wage growth distribution. I use the margins command in Stata 13 to calculates the average 
marginal effect across all the covariates in the model. The results shown in the figures are 
normalized hourly wages. Full results from the quantile regressions can be found in Appendix B.  
 Even though most workers in the U.S. stay less than 2 years in a low-end service 
occupation, Figure 2 predicts normalized wages if a worker stayed in the occupation longer. 
Wage growth for workers while in one of the 7 low-end service occupations is similar in the U.S. 
and W. Germany. A typical worker with median wage growth who stayed in the occupation for 
10 years in the U.S. or W. Germany would see an increase of about 1% of the median hourly 
wages a year – a modest growth rate. So, if the median hourly wage was $15 an hour that would 
be an increase of 15 cents a year or $1.50 in 10 years above inflation. The biggest difference in 
wage growth for workers accruing tenure in a low-end service occupation comes from workers at 
the bottom. In W. Germany, the workers with the lowest wages are able to achieve wage growth 
at about 2% of the median a year or double the growth rate of the median worker in either 
country. This rate is also double the rate of U.S. workers at 25th percentile while in the initial 
low-end service occupation. The major difference between the U.S. and W. German workers for 
wage growth in low-end service occupation is in the starting wages. Across the board, at the 25th, 
50th, and 75th percentiles the differences of starting wages between the countries are statistically 
significant for wage growth in the initial low-end service occupation.  
The wage growth models for workers after moving from a low-end service occupation in 
Figure 3 show a similar wage gap in wage levels between the U.S. and W. Germany at the 25th 
and 50th percentiles. These differences are statistically significant. The gap in wage levels 
between countries is absent at the 75th percentile for workers moving to a new occupation. The 
persistent gap in wage levels between the countries is likely due to the presence of collective 
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Figure 2: Predicted wage growth for workers while in a low-end service occupation, quantile models	
Figure 3: Predicted wage growth for workers after they move from a low-end service occupation, quantile models 
 
Figure 4: Predicted career wage growth for a worker with an average duration in a low-end service occupation, quantile models 	
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bargaining agreements in Germany that are raising the wage floor. The growth rates differ 
significantly top and bottom percentiles. While workers at the bottom (25th percentile) retain a 
modest growth rate of about 1% a year, a worker with a median growth rate has wages that 
would grow at a rate of about double at 2% a year, while workers at the top (75%) have a growth 
rate that begins to near 2.5% a year. The similarly low wage growth rates in both countries 
suggest that the vocational training system in Germany has not up-skilled these occupations 
resulting in higher returns to occupational tenure.  
 The higher growth rates and higher wage levels of workers who move from a low-end 
service occupation suggest that the primary path to upward mobility is by moving occupations. 
This appears to be true even for workers with the lowest starting wages and wage growth. Using 
a 2/3rds of the median wage as low-wage threshold threshold, an average low-end service 
workers in Germany at the bottom (p25) would only cross this threshold after 16 years in the 
occupation. An average U.S. worker at the bottom doesn’t come close to crossing this low-wage 
threshold even after a similar number of years. Workers who stay in the occupation in W. 
Germany with wage trajectories above the median can move above the low-wage threshold in 
less than 6 years of occupational tenure. Using the more stringent threshold of the bottom two 
quintiles, W. German workers in these occupations would need 16 years in the occupation to 
make it to the 3rd quintile of the hourly wage distribution if they had wage growth at the 75th 
percentile. None of the wage growth models for U.S. workers come even close to achieving 
upward mobility to the 3rd quintile after in 16 years of minimal wage gains. Only workers who 
move occupations with wage trajectories at the p50 (16 years) or above (4 years for p75) for W. 
Germany or the p75 (8 years) for the U.S. can achieve this level of upward mobility. These 
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findings indicate that for most low-end service occupations are dead-end jobs without a route 
into wages in the 3rd quintile of the full-time hourly wage distribution.  
 In Figures 4, I use average occupational tenure to combine the results from Figures 2 and 
3 to illustrate an actual average career wage trajectory for a worker staring in a low-end service 
occupation and then moving to a new occupation. Since occupational tenure differs greatly 
between the two countries, where the first models end and second model begins are different for 
each country. I use the median occupational duration in a low-end service occupation. This is 
less than 2 years for the U.S. and 6 to 8 years in West Germany. This is for illustrative purposes 
only because while likely, it isn’t clear that the worker at the 25th percentile in the first model is 
at the 25th percentile in the second model.  
What Figure 4 demonstrates is that the major difference between countries in wage 
trajectories is at the top of the distribution. U.S. workers who move out quickly to a better job 
experience much higher wage growth over their career. In contrast, workers in West Germany at 
the top of the distribution experience steady wage growth that accelerates after moving 
occupations 8 years after starting in the low-end service occupation. Moving out of a low-end 
service occupation in W. Germany appears to result in a small wage penalty for the workers at 
the p25 and p50 percentiles. However, this bump goes away two years later and more or less 
matches the steady wage growth for U.S. low-end service workers who change occupations more 
quickly.  
  To confirm the results from the quantile models, I use a discrete-time event history 
analysis to model the factors contributing to the upward mobility of workers in low-end service 
occupations out of the bottom two quintiles. As a reminder, I necessarily exclude workers in 
these occupations whose starting wages are in or above the 3rd quintile. 10.13% of West German 
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and 6.75% of U.S. workers of my sample of 7 low-end service occupations are excluded. These 
workers likely had wage trajectories above the 75th percentile in the wage growth models. In 
Figures 5, I present log odds from the final models for the event history model. Significant 
coefficients are marked with stars as on a standard table of regression results. Full result tables 
for seven nested models for each country can be found in Appendix B.  
 The variable for occupational tenure in the initial low-end service occupation is negative 
and significant for W. German workers. This measure is a constant. For workers who move 
occupations before achieving upward mobility, it is set to the number of years worked in the 
initial low-end service occupation. For workers achieving upward mobility in the initial 
occupation, it is set to the tenure they had the year they were observed to achieve wages in the 3rd 
or higher quintile. The negative effect indicates that W. German workers who move occupations 
sooner have an increased probability of achieving mobility into the 3rd or higher quintile. The 
effect increases with each year of tenure in the initial occupation. Staying 6 years in a low-end 
service occupation (as the does the median low-end service worker in W. Germany) decreases 
the log odds by about the same amount as increasing your education by obtaining a college 
degree. This is strong evidence that moving occupations quickly in W. Germany leads to upward 
wage mobility. The effect for occupational tenure in the initial low-end service occupation is 
small and insignificant in the U.S. models. Most workers move out of low-end service 
occupations within two years in the U.S., so my data are not detailed enough to find a gradient in 
the cost of increasing occupational tenure in a low-end service occupation.  
The largest effect in the U.S. model is moving occupations. The effect size is double the 
effect of moving for W. German low-end service workers. 60% of W. German low-end service  
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Figure 5: Significant coefficients from a discrete-time event history analysis, mobility out of the bottom two quintiles of the 
hourly wage distribution, full model, log odds 
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workers starting in the bottom quintiles achieve upward mobility by moving occupations. In the 
U.S. 90% achieve upward mobility by moving occupations. The variable occupational tenure 
tracks current tenure in a worker’s current occupation. The significant positive effect on 
occupational tenure for workers in both countries indicates that accruing tenure does increase the 
log odds of achieving upward mobility. This effect is particularly important for W. German 
workers. The effect size is large and increases with each year of tenure. Accruing 4 years of 
tenure after moving occupations in W. Germany increases the log odds of achieving upward 
mobility by the same amount as moving occupations or obtaining a college degree. A W. 
German worker in a low-end service occupation needs to move occupations and accrue 4 years 
on tenure in the new occupation in order to match the log odds of a U.S. worker changing 
occupations. The final negative effect in Figure 5 indicates that a worker’s log odds of achieving 
mobility decrease slightly with every passing year after moving to a new occupation.  
 The mobility analysis confirms what I found in the quantile wage growth models: low-
end service occupations are primarily dead-end jobs. Workers with a college degree who are 
likely using the job as transition, workers who increase their education level, and workers who 
moved quickly for unobserved reasons all have much greater log odds of achieving mobility out 
of the bottom wage quintiles in both countries. Younger workers are also more likely to achieve 
upward mobility in the U.S. Given the low levels of overall mobility out of low-end service 
occupations, these factors probably explain most of the upward mobility. One possibility for 
testing this hypothesis would be to remove workers who increase their education, have higher 
levels of education, and those who move up quickly.  
 The significant and large occupational tenure does temper the dead-end jobs conclusion 
for West Germany. It is possible that some workers are using low-end service occupations as a 
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stepping-stone. After moving to a new occupation, these workers could be staying in this new 
occupation because they are receiving greater returns to their skills, including the task-specific 
skills obtained in the initial low-end service occupation. Further analysis using a measure of skill 
similarity between occupations is needed to understand whether these workers transferring 
accumulated task-specific human capital across occupations.  It could also be that the barriers to 
occupational mobility inhibit workers from moving occupations again. In descriptive 
characteristics like age and gender, workers who move occupation look much the same as who 
do not move occupation (not shown). However, workers who move occupations are more likely 
to move occupations again in both countries.  
 Women and workers continuing to work part-time are less likely to move out of the 
bottom to quintiles. The part-time effect is in the expected direction, but insignificant in the W. 
German model.  What isn’t clear is to what extent the lower odds of mobility for women and 
part-time workers is a reflection of choice. I find a positive effect for having children in the 
household in West Germany and a negative effect for single workers in the U.S. (relative to 
married workers). I don’t have strong theories to explain these effects.  
 There is some variation between the 7 occupations in my study in terms of probability for 
upward mobility. In the U.S., personal and home care aides, childcare workers, and cleaners have 
significantly lower probabilities of upward mobility than retail salespersons. In W. Germany, 
only cleaners have a significantly lower probability. These occupations can be characterized as 
the most dead-end of the low-end service occupations in this study. In W. Germany, General 
Office Clerks have greater log odds of upward mobility, potentially as a result of being in an 
office context.   
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Figure 6: Cohort coefficients from discrete-time event history analysis, mobility out of the 
bottom two quintiles of the hourly wage distribution, full model, log odds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
In Figure 6, I show the cohort effect from the event history analysis of mobility out of the 
bottom two quintiles of the wage distribution. The story is one of relatively stable probability of 
upward mobility for low-end service workers in the U.S. Upward mobility was higher for 
workers entering these occupations in the booming economy of the early 1990s in the U.S. In 
contrast, the trend for W. Germany is one of decreasing log odds of mobility with each 
successive cohort entering these occupations. This finding fits with a story of growing low-wage 
work and labor market dualization over time as low-wage work has grown in Germany (Gautié 
and Schmitt 2010; Palier 2010; Thelen 2014).   
 
Conclusion  
 
 I find significant differences in occupational tenure for low-end service workers in the 
U.S. and W. Germany. This fits the theory that the stronger vocational training system in 
Germany limits occupational mobility through credentialing (Protsch and Solga 2015). Longer 
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occupational tenure is probably not explained by better job match for workers in low-end service 
occupations in W. Germany. I find that the slope of wage growth for workers staying in low-end 
service occupations is similarly low in both countries. The low rate of wage growth in both 
countries suggests that low-end service occupations are equally low-skill. The evidence 
presented suggests that the skill levels of low-end service occupations are not being increased by 
the strong vocational training system in Germany.  
The workers with the lowest wages (25th percentile) in these low-end service occupations 
in W. Germany experience a much greater rate of growth than their counterparts in the U.S. This 
finding suggests a higher wage floor, possibly as a result of collective bargaining agreements, 
raises the wages of the lowest paid workers as the gain occupational tenure. The strongest 
evidence for the impact of collective bargaining agreements is that on average workers in low-
end service occupations in Germany start at higher normalized hourly wages than their U.S. 
counterparts. 
 Higher starting wages, combined with higher occupational tenure, allow a number of 
workers in W. Germany to slowly climb into the 3rd quintile from the bottom quintiles of the 
hourly wage distribution through long occupational tenures. The higher wages combined with 
health insurance coverage and other work benefits probably makes low-end service occupations 
better jobs in Germany. However, these jobs are dead-end jobs for most workers in both 
countries. The event history analysis confirms that workers who move occupations in both 
countries have higher probabilities of upward mobility out of the bottom two quintiles. My 
findings indicate that the vocational training system in Germany likely traps workers in low-end 
service occupations by increasing barriers to moving occupations. So the vocational training 
system may be contributing to dualization in Germany by creating barriers to occupational 
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mobility. I suggest that the longer occupational tenure in of low-end service occupations in W. 
Germany explains the lower rate of upward mobility between the U.S. and W. Germany.  
 Moving occupations does not appear to be the result of a stepping stone process where 
workers accrue skill and move to a related occupation. Rather, the strong effects of workers who 
increase their education, workers with college degrees who are likely using the jobs as a 
transition to the labor market, and workers who move occupations quickly for unobserved 
reasons point to low-end service occupations being dead-end jobs. I do find evidence that some 
W. German workers may be using these occupations as stepping-stones. Further analysis could 
test this conclusion by controlling for the skill similarity of origin and destination occupations.
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APPENDIX A: OCCUPATIONAL HARMONIZATION 
 
 The Bureau of Labor Statistics data on the occupations in Table 1 uses the Standard 
Occupational Classification system used be federal agencies in the U.S. The data I use in my 
analysis for the U.S. comes from the PSID. The PSID uses a similar, but less detailed 
occupational classification system developed by the Census. In my analysis I use data from 1985 
to 2007. The PSID uses two variations of the Census Occupational codes over this period, the 
1970 codes through 2001 and the 2000 codes afterwards. I match the 1970 occupational 
categories with 2000 categories using available crosswalks. I combined occupational codes to 
create harmonized occupations with the best fit between 1970 and 2000 systems.  
To make an accurate as possible comparison of the same work between the U.S. and 
Germany, I matched the harmonized Census occupations to the German Klassifikation der 
Berufe 1992 (KldB 1992) codes available in the SOEP. I use the International Labor 
Organization’s International Classification of Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88) crosswalks as a 
guide to match occupations. ISCO-88 codes are available in the SOEP, but I choose to use the 
more detailed KldB 1992 codes because the ISCO-88 categories are broader. This results in a 
better match between the U.S. and German occupational codes used in my analysis.   
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APPENDIX B: MODEL RESULT TABLES 
 
Table 4: Quantile model results for workers while in a low-end service occupation 
 
 
 
After	Move	Quantile	Models
U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger.
SLOPES
Initial	Occupation
Retail	Salesperson ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Personal	and	Home	Care	Aides 0.0113 -0.0106 -0.00550 -0.00804 0.0155 -0.00637 -0.000691 -0.0176*
(0.0124) (0.00982) (0.0119) (0.00686) (0.0122) (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.00810)
Childcare	Workers 0.0190 -0.00232 0.0118 -0.00301 0.0222 -0.00324 0.0714** 0.00586
(0.0138) (0.00883) (0.0159) (0.00550) (0.0136) (0.00792) (0.0158) (0.00765)
Cleaners -0.0169 -0.00478 -0.0110 0.000487 0.00117 -0.000791 -0.00812 0.00390
(0.0109) (0.00491) (0.00949) (0.00470) (0.0111) (0.00920) (0.00866) (0.00521)
Waiters	and	waitresses	 -0.0265 -8.61e-05 -0.0333* -0.0201** -0.0214 -0.0234** -0.0638** -0.0186*
(0.0141) (0.00859) (0.0158) (0.00554) (0.0109) (0.00895) (0.0137) (0.00802)
Hairstylists	and	Barbers 0.00615 0.0365** -0.0209 0.0274** -0.00255 0.0149* -0.0215 0.0244**
(0.0213) (0.00650) (0.0242) (0.00894) (0.0233) (0.00716) (0.0908) (0.00641)
General	Office	Clerks -0.0173 0.00830 -0.0380 0.00915 -0.0921* 0.0139** -0.0691 0.00431
(0.0715) (0.00479) (0.0361) (0.00737) (0.0399) (0.00465) (0.0467) (0.00508)
Time	Since	Starting	LW	Service	Occ.. 0.0563** 0.0281** 0.0853** 0.0163 0.0649** 0.00420 0.0689** 0.0511**
(0.0169) (0.00808) (0.0203) (0.0102) (0.0146) (0.00768) (0.0180) (0.0117)
Time	Since	Starting	Squared -0.00117* -0.000867** -0.000895 -0.000578 -0.00136** 0.000185 -0.000738 -0.00159**
(0.000503) (0.000225) (0.000647) (0.000333) (0.000520) (0.000257) (0.000694) (0.000367)
Education	Credential
Secondary	School	or	Less 0.0151* -0.00178 0.00337 -0.00959* 0.0117 -0.00174 0.00130 -0.0172**
(0.00749) (0.00366) (0.0100) (0.00486) (0.00909) (0.00709) (0.00832) (0.00506)
Secondary	School	&		Voc.	Training ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
College	or	University	Degree -0.0269 -0.00531 -0.0214 -0.000303 -0.0179 0.00128 -0.0302 -0.00112
(0.0159) (0.00560) (0.0263) (0.00676) (0.0126) (0.00567) (0.0169) (0.00777)
Increased	Education	in	Previous	2	Years 0.00961 -0.0104 0.00751 -0.0102 -0.0124 -0.0132 0.0139 -0.0109
(0.0311) (0.00875) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0197) (0.0144) (0.0205) (0.0356)
Currently	Working	Part-Time 0.0126* 0.00604* 0.000851 0.00276 0.00485 -0.00176 -0.00688 0.00387
(0.00524) (0.00253) (0.00839) (0.00462) (0.00631) (0.00540) (0.00597) (0.00435)
Not	Employed	2	years	ago 0.00637 -0.00222 0.00986 -0.00478 0.00794 -0.000952 0.0419 -0.0146
(0.0184) (0.00392) (0.0130) (0.0107) (0.00651) (0.00561) (0.0225) (0.00966)
Female -0.0428** -0.00106 -0.0275** 0.00387 -0.0388** 0.00123 -0.0327** 0.00537
(0.00822) (0.00484) (0.00680) (0.00618) (0.0105) (0.00628) (0.00762) (0.00639)
Age	Started	in	Iniital	Occupation
17	to	25 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
26	to	45 -0.00292 -0.0118** -0.0198 -0.00486 -0.0151* -0.00247 -0.00359 -0.0148*
(0.00906) (0.00410) (0.0119) (0.00478) (0.00732) (0.00498) (0.0137) (0.00587)
46	to	65 -0.0108 -0.00637 -0.0398* -0.00630 -0.0293** 0.00378 -0.0139 -0.0179*
(0.0113) (0.00742) (0.0157) (0.00777) (0.0110) (0.00938) (0.0147) (0.00798)
66	and	older -0.0209 -0.612** -0.0464* -0.616** -0.0231 -0.726** -0.0160 -0.598**
(0.0284) (0.179) (0.0231) (0.0645) (0.0241) (0.0632) (0.0204) (0.0981)
Not	White	(U.S.)												 -0.00160 -- -0.00306 -- -0.00270 -- -0.0112 --
(0.00694) -- (0.00966) -- (0.00750) -- (0.0120) --
Non-western	European	(Ger.) -- 0.00843* -- 0.00991* -- 0.00998 -- 0.0119*
-- (0.00453) -- (0.00486) -- (0.00611) -- (0.00503)
Marital	Status
Married ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Single 0.00509 0.0316** -0.0233* 0.0217** -0.0142 0.0183** -0.0126 0.0355**
(0.0103) (0.00535) (0.0115) (0.00693) (0.0104) (0.00575) (0.0151) (0.00618)
Seperated	or	Divorced 0.0123 -1.83e-05 0.00110 0.00381 0.00709 -0.00155 0.00796 0.00328
(0.00799) (0.00403) (0.00762) (0.00494) (0.0115) (0.00404) (0.00991) (0.00491)
Not	Married	with	Children -0.00757 0.00621 0.000172 0.00712 -0.00209 0.00445 0.00408 -0.00190
(0.0106) (0.00627) (0.0118) (0.00862) (0.0122) (0.00706) (0.0115) (0.00974)
Child(ren)	in	the	Household 0.00337 0.00264 0.00539 0.00411 0.00882 0.00618 0.00104 0.00360
(0.00696) (0.00331) (0.00986) (0.00560) (0.00980) (0.00443) (0.00928) (0.00388)
Growth	Curve	(Average) Quantile	p50 Quantile	p75 Quantile	p25
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(0.00696) (0.00331) (0.00986) (0.00560) (0.00980) (0.00443) (0.00928) (0.00388)
Cohort	(Year	Started	Initial	Occupation)
1980-1989 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
1990-1995 -0.00516 -0.00757 -0.00454 -0.00833* -0.00590 -0.00464 0.00583 -0.00979
(0.00729) (0.00418) (0.00743) (0.00403) (0.00796) (0.00713) (0.0108) (0.00544)
1996-2001 -0.00794 -0.0106 -0.00685 -0.0120* -0.00905 -0.00321 0.00460 -0.0153
(0.00925) (0.00568) (0.00957) (0.00590) (0.0126) (0.00710) (0.00876) (0.00854)
2002-2007 -0.0115 -0.0225 -0.0181 -0.00756 -0.00578 -0.00699 -0.0142 -0.0422*
(0.0151) (0.0127) (0.0141) (0.0173) (0.0225) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0170)
Voluntary	Firm	Change	Last	4	Years 0.0213 -0.0190** 0.0167 -0.00421 0.0218 -0.00272 0.0102 -0.0160
(0.0131) (0.00537) (0.0463) (0.00990) (0.0164) (0.00891) (0.0128) (0.0277)
Involuntary	Firm	Change	Last	4	Years -0.00461 0.0164* 0.00219 -0.0147 0.00902 -0.0126 -0.0102 -0.00294
(0.0150) (0.00770) (0.0121) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0135) (0.0143) (0.0255)
U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger.
LEVELS
Initial	Occupation
Retail	Salesperson ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Personal	and	Home	Care	Aides -0.0480 0.0932 0.0613** 0.117** 0.0184 0.0577 0.0597** 0.153*
(0.0273) (0.0571) (0.0200) (0.0429) (0.0299) (0.0455) (0.0158) (0.0637)
Childcare	Workers -0.465** 0.0502 -0.172** 0.118** -0.114** 0.0615 -0.779** -0.000415
(0.0291) (0.0477) (0.0277) (0.0422) (0.0358) (0.0317) (0.102) (0.0840)
Cleaners -0.0631* -0.0486 0.0168 -0.0459 0.0100 -0.0219 -0.000954 -0.0816*
(0.0255) (0.0278) (0.0182) (0.0285) (0.0307) (0.0312) (0.0167) (0.0416)
Waiters	and	waitresses	 -0.193** -0.0663 -0.0777** -0.0804* 0.00448 -0.0557 -0.120** -0.0239
(0.0288) (0.0361) (0.0201) (0.0334) (0.0497) (0.0366) (0.0253) (0.0510)
Hairstylists	and	Barbers 0.199** -0.536** 0.137 -0.511** 0.436** -0.314** -0.00200 -0.582**
(0.0697) (0.0388) (0.116) (0.0778) (0.0893) (0.0648) (0.107) (0.0762)
General	Office	Clerks 0.156** 0.0323 0.230** 0.0496 0.291** 0.0517* 0.215** 0.00826
(0.0444) (0.0252) (0.0337) (0.0339) (0.0411) (0.0250) (0.0337) (0.0388)
Education	Credential
Secondary	School	or	Less -0.0646** 0.114** -0.0323 0.0580* -0.0690** -0.00117 -0.0357* 0.118**
(0.0236) (0.0232) (0.0197) (0.0274) (0.0257) (0.0230) (0.0168) (0.0417)
Secondary	School	&		Voc.	Training ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
College	or	University	Degree 0.168** 0.147** 0.124** 0.0700 0.132** 0.113** 0.112** 0.0982
(0.0379) (0.0302) (0.0337) (0.0370) (0.0413) (0.0362) (0.0297) (0.0508)
Increased	Education	in	Previous	2	Years -0.0546 0.0652 0.0359 0.0646 0.150 0.0350 0.000492 0.104
(0.149) (0.0818) (0.0980) (0.103) (0.169) (0.129) (0.0909) (0.227)
Currently	Working	Part-Time -0.126** -0.109** -0.112** -0.166** -0.162** -0.100** -0.0716** -0.186**
(0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0139) (0.0267) (0.0200) (0.0214) (0.0126) (0.0301)
Not	Employed	2	years	ago -0.0381 -0.0598** -0.0474** -0.0604* -0.0453 -0.0837** -0.0571** -0.0243
(0.0209) (0.0219) (0.0148) (0.0249) (0.0243) (0.0203) (0.0163) (0.0389)
Female -0.0984** -0.211** -0.103** -0.223** -0.103** -0.198** -0.0781** -0.253**
(0.0226) (0.0258) (0.0179) (0.0274) (0.0276) (0.0266) (0.0162) (0.0510)
Age	Started	in	Iniital	Occupation
17	to	25 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
26	to	45 0.0250 0.199** 0.0220 0.118** 0.0268 0.115** 0.00174 0.217**
(0.0214) (0.0281) (0.0145) (0.0326) (0.0269) (0.0285) (0.0162) (0.0522)
46	to	65 0.00435 0.119** 0.0293 0.102** 0.0317 0.0463 0.00700 0.222**
(0.0292) (0.0385) (0.0201) (0.0380) (0.0369) (0.0323) (0.0219) (0.0594)
66	and	older -0.226** -0.166 -0.0507 -0.259* -0.0685 -0.212** -0.120 -0.0662
(0.0689) (0.242) (0.0613) (0.130) (0.0602) (0.0643) (0.0639) (0.0855)
Not	White	(U.S.)												 -0.0356 -- -0.0480** -- -0.0744** -- -0.0230 --
(0.0192) -- (0.0138) -- (0.0228) -- (0.0162) --
Non-western	European	(Ger.) -- -0.0606* -- -0.0626* -- -0.0489* -- -0.0465
-- (0.0259) -- (0.0311) -- (0.0232) -- (0.0307)
Marital	Status
Married ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Single -0.0273 -0.154** -0.00812 -0.140** 0.00738 -0.103** -0.0327 -0.184**
(0.0296) (0.0310) (0.0233) (0.0318) (0.0391) (0.0335) (0.0219) (0.0533)
Seperated	or	Divorced -0.0501 0.0670* -0.0260 0.0504 -0.00189 0.0738* -0.0421 0.0778
(0.0306) (0.0342) (0.0228) (0.0395) (0.0433) (0.0302) (0.0240) (0.0448)
Not	Married	with	Children 0.0248 -0.118** -0.0130 -0.121* -0.0673 -0.0920* 0.0104 -0.124
(0.0343) (0.0362) (0.0255) (0.0507) (0.0412) (0.0377) (0.0253) (0.0648)
Growth	Curve	(Average) Quantile	p50 Quantile	p75 Quantile	p25
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Table 5: Quantile model results for workers after they move from a low-end service occupation 
   
(0.0343) (0.0362) (0.0255) (0.0507) (0.0412) (0.0377) (0.0253) (0.0648)
Child(ren)	in	the	Household 0.0117 -0.0178 0.0230 0.0200 0.0267 0.0340 0.00575 0.00291
(0.0246) (0.0263) (0.0192) (0.0277) (0.0305) (0.0261) (0.0190) (0.0377)
Cohort	(Year	Started	Initial	Occupation)
1980-1989 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
1990-1995 0.0727** -0.0301 0.0788** -0.0216 0.0796** 0.0151 0.0508** 2.94e-05
(0.0227) (0.0264) (0.0191) (0.0298) (0.0305) (0.0253) (0.0176) (0.0438)
1996-2001 0.0703** 0.00560 0.0983** -0.00635 0.0654* -0.00862 0.102** 0.0461
(0.0252) (0.0277) (0.0198) (0.0319) (0.0273) (0.0270) (0.0170) (0.0448)
2002-2007 0.0700** 0.0512 0.0962** 0.0102 0.0614* 0.0196 0.0967** 0.0817
(0.0244) (0.0299) (0.0180) (0.0327) (0.0270) (0.0271) (0.0168) (0.0548)
Voluntary	Firm	Change	Last	4	Years 0.0283 0.294** -0.0376 0.0983 -0.0766 0.0579 0.0130 0.203
(0.0764) (0.0493) (0.155) (0.0771) (0.0909) (0.0611) (0.0633) (0.157)
Involuntary	Firm	Change	Last	4	Years -0.220** -0.365** -0.180** -0.0252 -0.257** 0.0108 -0.0894 -0.184
(0.0785) (0.0705) (0.0558) (0.143) (0.0620) (0.105) (0.0492) (0.175)
Constant 4.187** 4.192** 4.042** 4.355** 4.345** 4.480** 3.881** 3.996**
(0.0412) (0.0447) (0.0329) (0.0468) (0.0507) (0.0395) (0.0301) (0.0858)
U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger.
Number	Persons 3,150 1,816 3,150 1,816 3,150 1,816 3,150 1,816
Number	of	Observations 4,981 4,067 4,981 4,067 4,981 4,067 4,981 4,067
Avg.	Observations	per	Person 1.6 2.2 1.6 2.2 1.6 2.2 1.6 2.2
R-squared -- -- 15.8 27.7 13.9 26.2 14.9 28.1
sd(Time	since	moving	from	initial	occ.) 0.0162 0.0168
sd(Constant) 0.353 0.317
sd(Residual) 0.366 0.266
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
Growth	Curve	(Average) Quantile	p50 Quantile	p75 Quantile	p25
	**	p<0.01,	*	p<0.05
After	Move	Quantile	Models
U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger.
SLOPES
Initial	Occupation
Retail	Salesperson ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Personal	and	Home	Care	Aides 0.00142 0.00318 -0.00717 -0.0185 -0.00259 0.000927 -0.00559 -0.0131
(0.00462) (0.0102) (0.00554) (0.0123) (0.00700) (0.0144) (0.00519) (0.00980)
Childcare	Workers 0.00674 0.0115 0.00111 -0.000365 0.00654 -0.00399 0.00527 -0.0199**
(0.00424) (0.0139) (0.00476) (0.0102) (0.00499) (0.0119) (0.00433) (0.00783)
Cleaners -0.00673 0.000402 0.00177 -0.00502 0.00282 0.00211 -0.00406 -0.000891
(0.00391) (0.00620) (0.00470) (0.00909) (0.00441) (0.00860) (0.00437) (0.00663)
Waiters	and	waitresses	 0.000615 0.00714 -0.00284 0.0125 -0.00244 0.0130 -0.00184 0.00838
(0.00436) (0.00730) (0.00525) (0.0154) (0.00598) (0.0129) (0.00425) (0.0143)
Hairstylists	and	Barbers 0.0188* -0.0120 0.0464** 0.00391 0.0563** -0.00873 0.0119 -0.00375
(0.00949) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.00885) (0.0164) (0.00823) (0.0149) (0.00989)
General	Office	Clerks -0.00434 -0.00523 0.00496 0.000356 -0.000798 0.00130 0.00787 -0.00201
(0.00660) (0.00477) (0.00599) (0.00700) (0.0103) (0.00678) (0.0110) (0.00550)
Time	Since	Moving	from	Initial	Occ. 0.0344** 0.0196 0.0143 0.00969 0.0316* 0.0201 0.0123 0.0216
(0.00705) (0.0104) (0.0119) (0.0172) (0.0128) (0.0155) (0.0107) (0.0170)
Time	Since	Moving	Squared -0.000640* 0.000578 -0.000358 -0.000425 -0.000479 -0.000178 -0.000475 -0.000284
(0.000259) (0.000486) (0.000455) (0.000902) (0.000488) (0.000800) (0.000462) (0.000885)
Tenure	in	Iniital	Occupation 0.00100 -0.00262* -1.97e-05 -0.000898 -0.00202 -0.00207 0.00116 -0.00170
(0.000848) (0.00110) (0.000917) (0.00158) (0.00130) (0.00180) (0.00101) (0.00158)
Occupation	Tenure -0.000107 -0.00180* -0.00193* -7.74e-05 -0.00157 -0.000444 -5.33e-05 -0.000992
(0.000535) (0.000714) (0.000815) (0.00110) (0.00112) (0.00102) (0.000822) (0.00119)
Education	Credential
Secondary	School	or	Less 0.00629* 0.00485 0.00768* -0.00108 0.00496 0.00332 0.00747* 0.000672
(0.00315) (0.00446) (0.00417) (0.00648) (0.00438) (0.00751) (0.00411) (0.00714)
Secondary	School	&		Voc.	Training ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
College	or	University	Degree 0.00142 0.00243 0.00619 -0.00418 0.0122 -0.00252 0.00468 0.00393
(0.00420) (0.00513) (0.00593) (0.00750) (0.00868) (0.0129) (0.00605) (0.00613)
Growth	Curve	(Average) Quantile	p50 Quantile	p75 Quantile	p25
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(0.00420) (0.00513) (0.00593) (0.00750) (0.00868) (0.0129) (0.00605) (0.00613)
U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger.
SLOPES	(continued)
Increased	Education	in	Previous	2	Years -0.000937 0.00212 0.00922 0.00343 -0.00192 0.0101 0.00133 0.00460
(0.00649) (0.00960) (0.0119) (0.00983) (0.00811) (0.0198) (0.00645) (0.0107)
Currently	Working	Part-Time 0.00118 0.00654* 0.00299 -0.00253 -0.000592 -0.00517 -0.000904 0.00324
(0.00190) (0.00314) (0.00280) (0.00613) (0.00301) (0.00692) (0.00287) (0.00523)
Not	Employed	2	years	ago 0.00285 0.0148 -0.00390 0.0272* -0.00421 0.00826 -0.00557 -0.000835
(0.00555) (0.00887) (0.00885) (0.0108) (0.0120) (0.0133) (0.00616) (0.0102)
Female -0.0111** -0.00436 0.000548 0.00725 -0.00470 0.00630 -0.00166 0.00126
(0.00329) (0.00471) (0.00466) (0.00744) (0.00474) (0.00846) (0.00415) (0.00612)
Age	Started	in	Iniital	Occupation
17	to	25 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
26	to	45 -0.0133** -0.0107* -0.00843 -0.00994 -0.0145* -0.00614 -0.00838 -0.0150*
(0.00374) (0.00483) (0.00435) (0.00681) (0.00603) (0.00595) (0.00496) (0.00610)
46	to	65 -0.0306** -0.0267** -0.0234** -0.0118 -0.0197* -0.000141 -0.0189** -0.0399*
(0.00527) (0.00787) (0.00704) (0.0121) (0.00796) (0.0176) (0.00574) (0.0165)
66	and	older -0.0163 -- -0.0230* -- -0.0335** -- 0.0302* --
(0.0186) -- (0.0116) -- (0.0112) -- (0.0136) --
Not	White	(U.S.)												 0.000500 -- 0.00144 -- 0.00210 -- -0.00116 --
(0.00292) -- (0.00374) -- (0.00303) -- (0.00384) --
Non-western	European	(Ger.) -- -0.00496 -- 0.00642 -- -0.00127 -- -0.00173
-- (0.00526) -- (0.00636) -- (0.00778) -- (0.00707)
Marital	Status
Married ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Single 0.0102* 0.00558 0.000683 0.00622 0.00524 0.00569 0.00144 0.00709
(0.00446) (0.00520) (0.00665) (0.00979) (0.00877) (0.00701) (0.00579) (0.00979)
Seperated	or	Divorced 0.00399 -0.00269 0.00489 -0.00128 0.00350 -0.0118 0.00451 0.00545
(0.00334) (0.00504) (0.00487) (0.00783) (0.00648) (0.00834) (0.00445) (0.00691)
Not	Married	with	Children -0.00764 0.00302 -0.00121 -0.0134 0.00130 -0.00375 -0.00254 -0.00604
(0.00412) (0.00659) (0.00609) (0.0114) (0.00705) (0.0108) (0.00598) (0.0111)
Child(ren)	in	the	Household 0.00111 -0.00678* 0.00826** 0.00815 0.00296 0.00332 0.00534 -0.00173
(0.00260) (0.00405) (0.00408) (0.00874) (0.00421) (0.00735) (0.00440) (0.00850)
Cohort	(Year	Started	Initial	Occupation)
1980-1989 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
1990-1995 -0.000402 0.00245 0.0709** -0.0820* 0.0561 -0.0401 0.0692** -0.0596
(0.00316) (0.00438) (0.0248) (0.0324) (0.0290) (0.0317) (0.0245) (0.0406)
1996-2001 -0.00295 0.00232 0.0796** -0.105** 0.0569 -0.0725* 0.0820** -0.0877
(0.00472) (0.00674) (0.0251) (0.0324) (0.0312) (0.0346) (0.0255) (0.0453)
2002-2007 0.0146 -0.0399 0.102** -0.116** 0.125** -0.0357 0.0853** -0.0956
(0.0168) (0.0214) (0.0314) (0.0341) (0.0416) (0.0551) (0.0284) (0.0601)
Voluntary	Firm	Change	Last	4	Years 0.00634 -0.0205** 0.00523 -0.00521 0.0137 -0.00539 0.0117 -0.0114
(0.00485) (0.00710) (0.00610) (0.0113) (0.00904) (0.0123) (0.00839) (0.0145)
Voluntary	Occ.	Change	Last	4	Years 0.00176 -0.00932* -0.00105 -0.00130 -0.00562 -0.0104 0.00708 -0.00747
(0.00235) (0.00380) (0.00422) (0.00714) (0.00421) (0.00819) (0.00431) (0.00561)
Voluntary	Firm	&	Occ.	Change	Last	4	Years -0.00926 -0.000353 -0.0108 -0.00154 -0.0240* -0.00909 -0.0194* -0.00353
(0.00553) (0.00837) (0.00746) (0.0118) (0.0105) (0.0161) (0.00933) (0.0194)
Involuntary	Firm	Change	Last	4	Years -0.00933 0.0112 -0.0133 -0.00711 -0.0161** -0.0129 -0.00136 0.00453
(0.00568) (0.00963) (0.00845) (0.0116) (0.00614) (0.0110) (0.00562) (0.0311)
Involuntary	Occ.	Change	Last	4	Years 0.00868** 0.00997* 0.00609 0.00434 0.00505 0.00730 0.00695 0.00509
(0.00265) (0.00420) (0.00486) (0.00721) (0.00499) (0.00698) (0.00439) (0.00548)
Involuntary	Firm	&	Occ.	Change	Last	4	Years 0.0181** 0.00457 0.00890 0.0190 0.0170* 0.0274 0.00748 0.0110
(0.00632) (0.0107) (0.0100) (0.0166) (0.00705) (0.0141) (0.00671) (0.0290)
LEVELS
Initial	Occupation
Retail	Salesperson ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Personal	and	Home	Care	Aides -0.136** 0.0410 -0.0239 0.105 -0.0662 0.0300 -0.0341 0.0964
(0.0354) (0.0675) (0.0318) (0.0560) (0.0422) (0.0598) (0.0312) (0.0748)
Childcare	Workers -0.166** -0.0647 -0.0817* -0.182** -0.122** -0.0766 -0.111** -0.0142
(0.0343) (0.0831) (0.0336) (0.0578) (0.0384) (0.0550) (0.0296) (0.0657)
Cleaners -0.196** -0.0892* -0.130** -0.0468 -0.199** -0.0602 -0.106** -0.111*
(0.0306) (0.0408) (0.0304) (0.0387) (0.0331) (0.0452) (0.0265) (0.0533)
Waiters	and	waitresses	 -0.162** -0.119* -0.0936** -0.158** -0.130** -0.0973 -0.105** -0.126*
(0.0340) (0.0476) (0.0340) (0.0577) (0.0357) (0.0497) (0.0297) (0.0615)
Growth	Curve	(Average) Quantile	p50 Quantile	p75 Quantile	p25
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(0.0340) (0.0476) (0.0340) (0.0577) (0.0357) (0.0497) (0.0297) (0.0615)
U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger.
LEVELS	(continued)
Initial	Occupation	(continued)
Retail	Salesperson ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Hairstylists	and	Barbers -0.308** 0.0828 -0.161** 0.0333 -0.203** 0.0228 -0.110 0.0397
(0.0682) (0.0679) (0.0567) (0.0622) (0.0709) (0.0661) (0.0685) (0.0730)
General	Office	Clerks 0.122* 0.162** 0.117* 0.0852** 0.0990* 0.0938* 0.112* 0.127**
(0.0495) (0.0327) (0.0461) (0.0311) (0.0483) (0.0393) (0.0453) (0.0356)
Tenure	in	Iniital	Occupation 0.00544 0.00191 0.00557 -0.00516 0.0160* -0.00345 0.00533 0.00305
(0.00579) (0.00616) (0.00579) (0.00480) (0.00833) (0.00768) (0.00565) (0.00602)
Occupation	Tenure 0.0135* 0.0264** 0.0395** 0.0147 0.0268* 0.0130 0.0244* 0.0315**
(0.00623) (0.00809) (0.00983) (0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0133) (0.0104) (0.0147)
Education	Credential
Secondary	School	or	Less -0.0776** -0.0136 -0.0881** -0.0543* -0.0696* -0.0792* -0.0685** -0.0446
(0.0246) (0.0287) (0.0278) (0.0275) (0.0303) (0.0327) (0.0211) (0.0332)
Secondary	School	&		Voc.	Training ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
College	or	University	Degree 0.140** 0.118** 0.172** 0.180** 0.205** 0.210** 0.122* 0.118*
(0.0354) (0.0353) (0.0393) (0.0377) (0.0477) (0.0518) (0.0491) (0.0552)
Increased	Education	in	Previous	2	Years 0.00707 -0.0146 -0.0774 -0.131 -0.00978 -0.185 0.0285 -0.0767
(0.0553) (0.0696) (0.119) (0.0684) (0.0646) (0.109) (0.0485) (0.0860)
Currently	Working	Part-Time -0.0754** -0.0124 -0.156** -0.0623* -0.139** -0.0252 -0.142** -0.0847*
(0.0140) (0.0195) (0.0192) (0.0250) (0.0227) (0.0301) (0.0174) (0.0345)
Not	Employed	2	years	ago -0.0799 -0.146* -0.0328 -0.206* -0.0549 -0.0747 -0.0513 -0.0157
(0.0501) (0.0651) (0.0679) (0.0874) (0.103) (0.115) (0.0543) (0.0925)
Female -0.242** -0.226** -0.209** -0.183** -0.273** -0.237** -0.172** -0.180**
(0.0254) (0.0319) (0.0256) (0.0275) (0.0300) (0.0389) (0.0271) (0.0405)
Age	Started	in	Iniital	Occupation
17	to	25 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
26	to	45 0.0361 0.108** 0.00833 0.109** 0.0380 0.0795* -0.000214 0.128*
(0.0293) (0.0370) (0.0292) (0.0335) (0.0355) (0.0326) (0.0255) (0.0521)
46	to	65 0.0134 0.112* -0.0506 0.0781 -0.0553 0.0452 -0.0231 0.0967
(0.0382) (0.0482) (0.0378) (0.0443) (0.0422) (0.0627) (0.0324) (0.0660)
66	and	older -0.330** -- -0.177* -- -0.186 -- -0.297** --
(0.0887) -- (0.0828) -- (0.0985) -- (0.102) --
Not	White	(U.S.)												 -0.0631** -- -0.0785** -- -0.0963** -- -0.0471* --
(0.0222) -- (0.0206) -- (0.0247) -- (0.0203) --
Non-western	European	(Ger.) -- 0.0169 -- -0.00569 -- -0.00894 -- 0.0764*
-- (0.0345) -- (0.0340) -- (0.0383) -- (0.0380)
Marital	Status
Married ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Single -0.100** -0.0469 -0.0722* -0.000741 -0.0713 -0.0196 -0.0463 0.0360
(0.0294) (0.0315) (0.0359) (0.0375) (0.0389) (0.0400) (0.0344) (0.0519)
Seperated	or	Divorced -0.0599* 0.0851* -0.0996** 0.107* -0.0766 0.113* -0.0722* 0.122*
(0.0278) (0.0366) (0.0349) (0.0474) (0.0391) (0.0489) (0.0308) (0.0617)
Not	Married	with	Children 0.0722* -0.0121 0.0445 0.0404 0.0177 -0.00746 0.0425 -0.0344
(0.0316) (0.0416) (0.0393) (0.0511) (0.0456) (0.0540) (0.0368) (0.0723)
Child(ren)	in	the	Household -0.0112 0.0629* -0.0449 0.0373 -0.0232 0.0459 -0.0158 0.103*
(0.0211) (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0344) (0.0322) (0.0403) (0.0264) (0.0489)
Cohort	(Year	Started	Initial	Occupation)
1980-1989 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
1990-1995 0.0528 -0.0804* -0.00150 0.00515 -0.00179 0.00203 -0.00137 -0.000687
(0.0270) (0.0339) (0.00382) (0.00652) (0.00503) (0.00544) (0.00426) (0.00783)
1996-2001 0.0711* -0.105** -0.0135* 0.00758 -0.0153* -0.00456 -0.0109* 0.0108
(0.0285) (0.0359) (0.00603) (0.00893) (0.00700) (0.00959) (0.00551) (0.0118)
2002-2007 0.120** -0.0709 0.0170 -0.0213 0.00421 -0.0903* -0.00389 0.0247
(0.0328) (0.0445) (0.0210) (0.0207) (0.0234) (0.0380) (0.0219) (0.0317)
Voluntary	Firm	Change	Last	4	Years 0.0997* 0.286** 0.126* 0.0962 0.0358 0.0699 0.0666 0.115
(0.0420) (0.0511) (0.0533) (0.0669) (0.0575) (0.0688) (0.0609) (0.0794)
Voluntary	Occ.	Change	Last	4	Years 0.134** 0.207** 0.148** 0.144** 0.177** 0.174** 0.110** 0.191**
(0.0207) (0.0303) (0.0325) (0.0499) (0.0381) (0.0491) (0.0331) (0.0485)
Involuntary	Firm	Change	Last	4	Years 0.108* 0.0419 -0.0204 0.0237 0.0960 0.0351 0.0951 0.0470
(0.0472) (0.0635) (0.0609) (0.0830) (0.0733) (0.0881) (0.0679) (0.105)
Involuntary	Occ.	Change	Last	4	Years -0.0566 -0.245** 0.0159 0.0503 0.0210 -0.00630 -0.0340 -0.0765
(0.0521) (0.0751) (0.0985) (0.0784) (0.0732) (0.0820) (0.0578) (0.279)
Growth	Curve	(Average) Quantile	p50 Quantile	p75 Quantile	p25
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(0.0521) (0.0751) (0.0985) (0.0784) (0.0732) (0.0820) (0.0578) (0.279)
Voluntary	Firm	&	Occ.	Change	Last	4	Years -0.184** -0.172** -0.0890* -0.0838 -0.0612 -0.100* -0.106** -0.0521
(0.0240) (0.0353) (0.0428) (0.0506) (0.0440) (0.0464) (0.0367) (0.0496)
Involuntary	Firm	&	Occ.	Change	Last	4	Years -0.235** -0.0506 -0.163 -0.326** -0.232** -0.317** -0.134* -0.227
(0.0581) (0.0853) (0.107) (0.0941) (0.0779) (0.113) (0.0665) (0.279)
Constant 4.482** 4.270** 4.492** 4.355** 4.766** 4.555** 4.208** 4.062**
(0.0466) (0.0557) (0.0462) (0.0553) (0.0601) (0.0583) (0.0454) (0.0793)
U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger. U.S. W.	Ger.
Number	Persons 2,201 886 2,201 886 2,201 886 2,201 886
Number	of	Observations 7,291 2,614 7,291 2,614 7,291 2,614 7,291 2,614
Avg.	Observations	per	Person 3.3 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.3 3.0
R-squared 24.7 26.1 24.4 25.1 24.7 25.9
sd(Time	since	moving	from	initial	occ.) 0.0315 0.025
sd(Constant) 0.406 0.32
sd(Residual) 0.262 0.201
Standard	errors	in	parentheses 	**	p<0.01,	*	p<0.05
Growth	Curve	(Average) Quantile	p50 Quantile	p75 Quantile	p25
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Table 6: Discrete-time event history analysis results, mobility out of the bottom two quintiles of the full-time hourly wage 
distribution 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Initial	Occupation
Retail	Salesperson ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Personal	and	Home	Care	Aides 0.179 0.0936 -0.00967 0.193 0.0431 0.122 0.0344 -0.701*** -0.631*** -0.586*** -0.328* -0.319* -0.272 -0.316*
(0.281) (0.286) (0.294) (0.305) (0.337) (0.339) (0.341) (0.128) (0.129) (0.130) (0.145) (0.155) (0.157) (0.158)
Childcare	Workers -0.0314 0.0804 -0.263 -0.232 -0.180 -0.129 -0.131 -0.700*** -0.746*** -0.737*** -0.435** -0.512** -0.508** -0.554***
(0.280) (0.283) (0.327) (0.345) (0.350) (0.350) (0.353) (0.128) (0.129) (0.130) (0.145) (0.162) (0.165) (0.166)
Cleaners -0.627*** -0.683*** -0.753*** -0.597** -0.606** -0.613** -0.658** -0.828*** -0.798*** -0.825*** -0.751*** -0.809*** -0.838*** -0.838***
(0.177) (0.178) (0.184) (0.208) (0.219) (0.219) (0.221) (0.118) (0.118) (0.121) (0.134) (0.146) (0.148) (0.148)
Waiters	and	waitresses	 -0.487* -0.567* -0.500* -0.575* -0.464 -0.421 -0.397 -0.307* -0.283* -0.297* -0.212 -0.114 -0.0621 -0.0589
(0.238) (0.241) (0.247) (0.258) (0.263) (0.264) (0.265) (0.122) (0.123) (0.125) (0.134) (0.143) (0.146) (0.146)
Hairstylists	and	Barbers -0.746** -0.707* -0.665* -0.599* -0.495 -0.431 -0.448 0.409* 0.317 0.333 0.620** 0.114 0.215 0.183
(0.276) (0.279) (0.283) (0.302) (0.319) (0.324) (0.325) (0.197) (0.200) (0.200) (0.224) (0.295) (0.297) (0.298)
General	Office	Clerks 0.281* 0.244 0.237 0.236 0.291 0.393* 0.341* -0.201 -0.209 -0.259 0.133 0.0141 0.00153 0.0141
(0.136) (0.138) (0.141) (0.146) (0.154) (0.157) (0.158) (0.188) (0.190) (0.192) (0.206) (0.223) (0.229) (0.230)
Tenure	in	Iniital	Occupation -0.0315** 0.00685 -0.143*** -0.140*** -0.153*** -0.162*** -0.175*** -0.0754*** -0.00536 -0.0194 0.00752 -0.00348 -0.00611 0.00474
(0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0222) (0.0235) (0.0246) (0.0253) (0.0255) (0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0198) (0.0211) (0.0257) (0.0261) (0.0266)
Moved	from	Initial	Occupation 0.862*** 1.115*** 1.134*** 0.954*** 0.972*** 0.941*** 1.636*** 1.758*** 1.815*** 1.948*** 1.922*** 1.957***
(0.150) (0.161) (0.167) (0.186) (0.189) (0.191) (0.126) (0.131) (0.139) (0.165) (0.167) (0.168)
Time	Since	Moving	from	Initial	Occ. 0.0794*** -0.0289 -0.0387 -0.0387 -0.0511* -0.0616** -0.0254** -0.0402*** -0.0315** -0.0458** -0.0496** -0.0427**
(0.0155) (0.0203) (0.0214) (0.0226) (0.0232) (0.0235) (0.00957) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0158)
Occupation	Tenure 0.255*** 0.271*** 0.262*** 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.0684** 0.0807*** 0.0569* 0.0587* 0.0627*
(0.0266) (0.0283) (0.0308) (0.0315) (0.0312) (0.0214) (0.0228) (0.0261) (0.0265) (0.0265)
Female -0.826*** -0.890*** -0.976*** -0.960*** -1.130*** -1.006*** -1.051*** -1.048***
(0.140) (0.156) (0.161) (0.163) (0.0982) (0.112) (0.117) (0.117)
Age	Started	in	Iniital	Occupation -0.00582 -0.00922 -0.0142 -0.00759 -0.0270*** -0.0297*** -0.0331*** -0.0347***
(0.00645) (0.00715) (0.00840) (0.00862) (0.00462) (0.00527) (0.00569) (0.00576)
Not	White	(U.S.)												 -- -- -- -- -0.219* -0.243* -0.157 -0.151
-- -- -- -- (0.0927) (0.101) (0.105) (0.106)
Non-western	European	(Ger.) 0.0379 0.0498 0.0742 0.0168 -- -- -- --
(0.168) (0.175) (0.177) (0.178) -- -- -- --
Education	Credential
Secondary	School	or	Less -0.171 -0.117 -0.168 -0.169 -0.281* -0.243 -0.211 -0.210
(0.167) (0.173) (0.174) (0.175) (0.113) (0.125) (0.127) (0.128)
Secondary	School	&		Voc.	Training ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
College	or	University	Degree 0.779*** 0.787*** 0.782*** 0.829*** 0.868*** 0.929*** 0.953*** 0.983***
(0.161) (0.173) (0.174) (0.177) (0.147) (0.161) (0.166) (0.167)
Increased	Education	in	Previous	2	Years 0.871** 1.021** 1.036** 1.052** 1.151*** 1.038*** 1.035*** 1.031***
(0.297) (0.316) (0.318) (0.320) (0.209) (0.240) (0.242) (0.244)
Not	Employed	2	years	ago -0.162 -0.207 -0.181 0.385* 0.381 0.363
(0.246) (0.246) (0.247) (0.196) (0.199) (0.199)
Started	Initial	Occ	Working	Part-Time 0.0270 0.0378 0.0585 -0.158 -0.144 -0.135
(0.166) (0.168) (0.169) (0.113) (0.114) (0.115)
Currently	Working	Part-Time -0.129 -0.285 -0.221 -0.535*** -0.532*** -0.531***
(0.173) (0.176) (0.178) (0.128) (0.130) (0.130)
Count	of	Obs.	Working	Part-Time -0.00542 0.00690 -0.0131 0.00867 0.0112 0.0141
(0.0570) (0.0586) (0.0589) (0.0473) (0.0478) (0.0478)
United	StatesWest	Germany
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES	(continued)
Firm	Tenure 0.278 0.297* 0.285 0.0220 0.0201 0.0199
(0.148) (0.150) (0.150) (0.0153) (0.0156) (0.0157)
Firm	Change	in	Previous	2	Years 0.319 0.379 0.380 -0.118 -0.0881 -0.0779
(0.256) (0.257) (0.258) (0.127) (0.129) (0.129)
Marital	Status
Married ref. ref.
Single -0.0954 -0.0707 -0.601*** -0.633***
(0.214) (0.217) (0.176) (0.177)
Seperated	or	Divorced 0.439 0.458* -0.207 -0.214
(0.230) (0.230) (0.173) (0.173)
Not	Married	with	Children -0.398 -0.424 0.148 0.123
(0.276) (0.276) (0.208) (0.209)
Child(ren)	in	the	Household 0.687*** 0.710*** -0.0245 -0.00761
(0.181) (0.182) (0.128) (0.128)
Cohort	(Year	Started	Initial	Occupation)
1980-1989 ref.
1990-1995 -0.178 0.406***
(0.154) (0.118)
1996-2001 -0.469* 0.127
(0.186) (0.138)
2002-2007 -0.947** 0.353
(0.297) (0.184)
Constant -2.470*** -3.164*** -3.247*** -2.624*** -3.040*** -3.167*** -3.020*** -2.283*** -3.526*** -3.596*** -2.037*** -1.952*** -1.734*** -1.937***
(0.111) (0.147) (0.152) (0.258) (0.526) (0.604) (0.611) (0.0728) (0.131) (0.135) (0.234) (0.285) (0.319) (0.329)
Number	Persons 2,189 2,189 2,131 2,011 1,680 1,679 1,679 4,196 4,196 4,075 3,750 3,356 3,329 3,329
Number	of	Observations 5,824 5,824 5,709 5,365 4,654 4,653 4,653 12,489 12,489 12,106 11,231 10,334 10,066 10,066
Avg.	Observations	per	Person 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.0 3.0
Pseudo	R-squared 3.9 8.69 9.76 14.10 16.05 17.65 22.18 2.42 8.78 9.7 18.01 20.79 22.27 25.68
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
United	States
***	p<0.001,	**	p<0.01,	*	p<0.05
West	Germany
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